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Abstract
The counter-intuitive features of Malcolm's analysis are reviewed. 
An attempt is made to avoid these difficulties by allowing the admission 
of criteria for dreaming other than Malcolm's. This leads to a 
consideration of Malcolm's use of the term"criterion" and reference 
is made to Malcolm's interpretation of Wittgenstein on the subject.
It is concluded that language is not criterion-governed ain the way 
that Malcolm (but not V^ittgenstein) thinks. An analysis of dreaming 
is then attempted on the basis of all the types of evidence we use 
for the occurrence of a dream, the approach being to determine what 
dreaming must be like if these can all be evidence for dreaming.
It is argued that our concept of dreaming is of a datable occurrence, 
but it is admitted that experimental evidence could arise which would 
incline us away from this view. This approach tends to represent 
dreaming as an unobservable, and to progress further, one needs
e c.*
to take account of our concept of dreaming as an ee\yu-rrenoe during 
sleep. Malcolm's arguments against this are rejected. The implications 
of treating dreaming as an experience are reviewed, and it is shown 
how this view avoids the difficulties which beset Malcolm's analysis.
It is argued that Malcolm's treatment of dreaming as a basis for 
scepticism, dependent on his view that one cannot make judgements 
in sleepj fails as there is reason to reject this view. However one 
of his arguments against the coherence principle is found pertinent, 
and an attempt i smade to refurbish the coherence ÿhinciple in the 
light of this. This leads us to a further consideration og scepticism, 
in which it is maintained that the problem of dream-scepticism, if 
pushed to its limits, loses its specific reference to dreaming.
1.
Malcolm, in his book 'Dreaming’ raises the question: how do we
acquire the concept of dreaming? (p^4 et.seq.) He maintains that 
we tend to see dreaming as an inward process, and do assume that we 
acquire the concept by observing this process in ourselves. To this 
he opposes two objections - (a) "How could it be determined that 
the inner states of different people were the same, that they meant 
the same by the word ’dreaming*?" (b) ’’How could one know that 
the inner state one calls 'dreaming' is the same in oneself each 
time?" Malcolm rejects memory impressions as a court of appeal, 
there being no possibility of checking them. One can avoid these 
difficulties by taking the descriptions people give of their private 
states as a means of telling what these states are, and whether they 
are the same. "But one cannot then allow the question whether these 
descriptions are in error or not - for this would be to fall back 
into the original difficulty." One must take the descriptions as 
the criterion of the inner occurences, "^le concept of dreaming is 
derived, not from dreaming, but from descriptions of dreams^ i.e. from 
the familiar phenomenon we call 'telling a dream'." Malcolm maintains 
that if someone were to raise the question whether j^ he/ really had 
dreamed or whether it merely seemed so on waking, then if he knew 
what would settle the question, he must be using something other than 
the report as the criterion of the dream, i.e. misusing the word 
"dream". Malcolm continues "We speak of 'remembering' dreams, and 
if we consider this expression it can appear to us to be a misuse of 
language." So "remembering dreams" is unlike remembering waking 
experiences: there is no external criterion by which we can check
our memory. V/e might amend our account on sedond telling, but only 
slightly, otherwise we "would no longer be said to be 'telling a 
dream'." (The psychoanalytic view that, during analysis, a person
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may radically alter his account of a dream, enshrines a revised 
concept of dreaming*) We cannot check dream-reports by reference 
to empirical laws because we can literally dream anything.
Nevertheless, says Malcolm, it is correct to speak of "remembering" 
a dream, though this use diverges radically from that regarding 
waking experience. Neglect of this latter fact leads to the 
following kind of reasoning. (Yost and Kalish PQ 55 pp109-124)
"Dreaming is a real experience. And since dreams can be remembered 
they must be conscious experiences. Just as it is correct to say 
that a dreamer really dreams and does not merely dream that he dreams, 
so is it correct to say that a dreamer is really aware of the contents 
of his dream, and does not merely dream that he is aware of them."
To this Malcolm replies that the only sense he can give to "Dreaming 
is a real experience" is that of the truism that people do dream, 
and that the argument depends on the assimilation of remembering a 
dream to remembering waking experiences. Its conclusion is unverifiable, 
there being no criterion for saying a sleeper is aware of his dream, 
other than his telling a dream, in which case the sense of "People 
are aware of their dreams" collapses into that of "People dream".
Malcolm denies he is claiming a dream the waking impressiçn, 
this being self-contradictory. But what we take as finally deciding 
that a man dreamed is that he sincerely tells a dream. The dream 
and the waking conviction are not logically independent; each could 
not exist regardless of whether the other existed. It is incoherent 
to suppose that "mankind might have told dreams without ever having 
dreams, or might have had dreams without ever having told dreams," 
for what would then establish the existence of a dreamt However, to 
fix the criterion for something is not to define it. "The criterion
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for someone’s having a sore foot is what he says and does in certain 
circumstances and that is not a sore foot." Once we abandon the 
assumption that the criterion and that of which it is a criterion are 
identical, there is no difficulty in the fact that the sentence for 
which we want a criterion is in the past tense. ("He was dreaming.") 
The reluctance we may feel to admitting this is due to a "haziness" 
on the borderline of our concept of dreaming: if a young man murmurs 
his sweetheart’s name in his sleep, we might say he dreaming about 
his sweetheart. For Malcolm, this is to say that if he were awakened, 
he would be able to tell a dream about his sweetheart. But when we 
say of a dog whining and twitching in its sleep, that it is dreaming, 
we are not predicting what it will tell us when it awakes; thus the 
usage is "not quite serious". One draws no practical consequences 
from the dreaming of the dog, but may do so from that of the young 
man. Should the young man awaken unable to recall a dream, to say 
"You have forgotten it" would have no content beyond that of "So, you 
have no dream to tell." If we say of someone sighing and muttering 
in his sleep, "He dreaming", our words have no clear sense, unless 
we are using his behaviour as evidence that he will be able to tell a 
dream. Malcolm is not, however, prepared to accept this as an adequate 
account of nightmares. "When a man cries out, struggles, appears 
to be afraid, is difficult to arouse, and continues to exhibit traces 
of fear as he awakens, we call it a nightmare, regardless of whether 
he can tell a dream." But "it is at least problematic whether we 
should say he was asleep while those struggles were going on."
Malcolm adopts the view that statements of the form "I dreamed 
so-and-so" are always inferential, not necessarily reached by conscious 
inference, but depending upon evidence that some event never occurred.
k.
But "What can have no justification and requires none is your 
statement that you have the impression that so-and-so occurred.”
Once someone has decided that certain events which he remembers on 
awakening did not occur, there is no further question of whether a 
dream really took place during sleep. This view that "I dreamed that p" 
implies "not-p" is illustrated in his discussion of Pharaoh's dreqm.
Not only could Pharaoh not have claimed to have dreamed if he really 
had believed that during the night he stood on the banks of the Nile 
etc., but also he could not have claimed to have dreamed if he really 
had believed that during the night it seemed to him that he did so. 
Malcolm places a restriction on this view. Someone in California 
might dream that Westminster Abbey was burned down, and learn the 
next day that this had actually occurred. But if his narrative 
contained statements like "I saw it burning", those statements would 
be false. It is not contingent that the perceptual contents of a 
dream are unveridical.
Such are the arguments presented in Chapter 12 of 'Dreaming'; 
it will frequently be necessary to refer to other sections of the book, 
but the core of Malcolm's thesis seems concentrated here. Malcolm 
admits that his views conflict with earlier approaches to the problem.
He quotes philosophers (Descartes, Aristotle, Kant, Russell) and 
psychologists (Frend, Hadfièld) to show they "believed a dream is 
both a form of mental activity and a conscious experience." (pp1-4)
To these proponents of the received opinion, we might add the Oxford 
Dictionary, which defines "dream" as "a train of thoughts, images or 
fancies passing through the mind during sleep, a vision during sleep." 
And indeed, Malcolm's views have oft@n been assailed by Ayer, Pears 
and others as giving a highly counter-intuitive reductive analysis of 
dreaming. It will be useful to review the kind of objections which
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might be raised - to his conclusions, rather than his way of arriving 
at them.
It is an avowed consequence of Malcolm’s views (Chapter 13) that 
it is senseless to speak of a dream as occurring at a certain time 
during sleep. Pears asks: might we not wish to say that, had someone
slept for a shorter period of time than he did on a particular occasion, 
he might not have had a particular dream? Many people report that 
if they were awakened for a short interval, and then fall asleep again, 
they continue to dream the same dream starting where they left off.
Would we not allow the possibility, that if the person had not been 
awqkened, he would, on waking eventually, have told a dream consisting 
of the two parts together? It is commonly believed that external 
stimuli can modify the content of a dream, and that we sometimes 
tell from a sleeper’s bodily movements that he is having a violent 
dream. One of Malcolm's defences (p?6) against the claim "that the 
dream occurred at the same time (or after) the physical event that 
causally influenced the content of the dream" is that this could only 
be a convention, for it is possible only to observe causal or temporal 
relations between physical events and dream-reports, not between 
physical events and dreams. For the moment, let us be content with 
asking whether, since there is a strong presumption that the sleeper 
is, at least, physiologically, influenced by the stimulus at the time 
of its occurrence, might there not be some psychological concomitance 
of the physical event.
We normally allow that a psychical event might have no outward 
manifestations, but perhaps we always require that it be logically 
possible that it should (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §380)
6*
This brings us back to the claim that we can sometimes tell from a 
sleeper's bodily movements that he is having a dream. Consider a 
few cases - (a) Some sleep walkar, carrying out apparently purposeful 
actions such as might be part of a conscious activity. He wakes and 
tells a dream involving such activity, (b) Someone talks in his 
sleep. His later dream-telling involves the words he spoke. (c) Some­
one in his sleep cries out as if in terror, and exhibits the bodily 
symptoms of fear. He wakes in a state of alarm, then exclaims with 
relief, "It's only a dreamI" Malcolm would say either that these are 
not cases of sound sleep, or that all we have is a correlation between 
dream-reports and movements during sleep, giving no evidence of events 
during sleep. But the dreamer's report is based on what seems 
to be a memory-irnpression. Malcolm would reply that this could not 
be a hypothesis, being incapable of verification, but only a definition,
A further difficulty involves his view that dream-memories are 
identified by their falsehood, their failure to cohere with publicly 
agreed events. But, as Pears says , we allow that a dream might 
recapitulate a real event. Malcolm, by his insistence^ that dreams 
do not occur in time, has debarred himself from the defence that the 
dream would differ from the event it recapitulated, in temporal 
location. (This defence might fail on other counts - to say that a 
dream occurs at time t is not to say that the dream is of something 
occurring at time t. This latter point would tell against him, were 
he to try to avail himself of the above defence, by saying his claim 
is not that a dream cannot be assigned to a particular period of 
sleep, but that it cannot be assigned to a sub-stretch of that period)
A related point is the difficulty for Malcolm in providing a principle 




dreams. If there are always slight differences between instances 
of a recurring dream, is this not contingent? Furthermore, suppose 
someone has two dreams on successive nights, differing only in one 
feature. How are we to know that the second dream had any content 
other than the feature in which it differs from the first?
Other difficulties for Malcolm spring from his insistence on 
something reiniscent of the verification principle. (p83 "the 
senselessness, in the sense of the impossibility of verification 
of the notion of a dream as an occurrence.") For Malcolm, there is 
no question of correlated phenomenon (dream-reports, external stimuli, 
bodily movements) being unified by the postulation of other entities, 
a procedure associated with science, but not absent from ordinary 
conceptualisation. This demand for the direct checkability of claims 
about dreams generates many idiosyncracies - (a) The concept of 
dreaming in animals, and children who have not learnt to talk, is 
either incoherent, or diverges radically from that of dreaming in 
human adults. Is our concept of dreaming as closely connected with 
language-possession, that the former^exist (as distinct from "become 
manifest") without the latter? Malcolm ought, in consistency, to 
maintain babies cannot have waking imagery, (b) It becomes impossible 
to spealc of dreams, or parts of dreams, or details of dreams, which 
one never remembers. Malcolm would deny that one can deduce that 
there must be some answer to questions about a detail of a dream, 
from generalisations about the real world. One cannot say "The man 
in my dream had a hat, which must have had some shape or other, since 
a hat must necessarily have some shape or other." Malcolm seems 
right in maintaining that one cannot deduce that the car in one's 
dream must have had a driver, from one's knowledge of the real world.
But suppose one is convinced that there was something striking about 
the paintwork of the car in one’s dream, though one cannot remember 
what. Malcolm would have to say that "He dreamed there was something 
striking about the paintwork" does not imply that there is a true 
sentence of the form "He dreamed the paintwork was X" (where X is a 
property other than "being striking"; To nalcoim, tue crucial thing 
about a dream-narrative, and the features he has to ascribe to dreams 
are close to those of narratives. Just as one can refer to a hat, 
without mentioning its shape, one can dream of a hat, without dreaming 
of its shape. (c) Pears points out that a person telling a dream 
might take time to achieve a narrative he accepts. If he corrects 
an earlier version, the question arises; which account are we to 
accept? It is hard to see that the answer could be more than a 
stipulation for Malcolm. (d) Malcolm’s verificationist approach 
makes it difficult to distinguish dreams, seeming memories of events 
that did not occur and inaccurate memories of events that did occur.
"It is unrealistic to suggest that whenever a sleeper makes a sincere 
memory claim that does not correspond with anything in his waking 
life, it should be treated as a criterion that he dreamed it." (Pears)
One’s first reaction to Malcolm's analysis might be to suggest 
that he stresses the primary criterion of dreaming to the exclusion 
of others. It might even seem ironic that he should pose as an 
interpreter of Wittgenstein - his attempt to pin down the language 
of dreaming by a single criterion seems at variance with a recognition 
of the complexity of a language of "family resemblance", which 
Wittgenstein emphasised. It is important to see that we have not 
achieved a refutation of Malcolm yet; we have enumerated several 
discrepancies between Malcolm’s account and our notion of dreaming.
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But it is inadequate simply to treat his conclusions as a reductio 
ad absurdum of his method, because of the possibility of our ordinary 
ways of thought being confused and because, even if they are not and 
cannot be reconclied with Malcolm’s views, of the need to identify 
the steps in his argument responsible for his counter-intuitive 
conclusions. A first step should be to examine his use of ’’criterion", 
apparently the key concept in his argument. I can find no explicit 
definition in his book, but various remarks throw light on it. He 
writes (p23) of the criterion for a man’s being awake as the facts 
which malve it "certain beyond question" that he is awake. He speaks 
(p5b) of the criterion for the occurrence of a dream as something 
that settles the question whether a dream occurred. He says (p55) 
speaking of the procedure of treating the descriptions people give 
of their private states as a determination of what these states are: 
"one cannot then permit a question to be raised as to whether these 
descriptions are in error or not...We must treat them as the criterion 
of what the inner occurrences are." Here and elsewhere, he quotes 
Wittgenstein: "An ’inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria."
Cleaily he believes he is using the term in the same v;ay as 
Wittgenstein. It would help, therefore, to know how he thinks 
Wittgenstein uses the terra. In his review of the "Investigations" 
(PRI954), he discusses this point. Let us examine this, bearing in
mind that it is the exegesis itself and not its adequacy that interests
us.
(a) He remarks "That the natural pain-behaviour and the utterance 
"It hurts" are each incorrigible, is what makes it possible for each 
of them to be a criterion of pain" (p83 ) Here again, we have the
idea of criteria as settling questions.
Footnotes
1. reference is to the reprint of the article in "Wittgenstein" 
ed. Pitcher
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(b) He elucidates the concept by focusing on its connection 
with teaching the use of words. Because we do not learn the use of 
the words "to say such-and-such to oneself" by someone’s pointing
to a process in the larynx, this cannot be our "criterion" that someone 
says such-and-such to himself.
(c) He writes that if we have brought to mind "what it is that 
would show that he grasped your teaching, that he understood the use 
of the words, then you have elicited the criterion for their use."
(d) Wittgenstein, says Malcolm, contrasts "criterion" with 
"symptom". He quotes the "Investigations" (§354) that so-and-so is 
the criterion of x is a matter, not of experience, but of"definition".
(e) But, as we have seen, Malcolm denies that to state the criterion 
for something is to define it.
(f) The propositionsivwhich describe the criterion of someone’s 
being in pain do not logically imply the proposition "He is in pain", 
for a criterion is satisfied only under certain circumstances. One 
cannot produce an exhaustive list of the circumstances, which count 
against the claim that a person exhibiting pain-behaviour is in pain, 
("the list is not infinite, but indefinite" - p86)
Malcolm seems right in regarding the conflict between (d) and 
(e) as merely apparent. The positive statements as to what a criterion 
is are (a), (b), (c) and (d). Does Malcolm take each of these as 
sufficient conditions for something's being a criterion? Or as necessary 
conditions? Or do some of them imply the others? We can assume that 
Malcolm is not thinking in terms of the second possibility; his 
exposition consists in successive attempts at elucidation. Furthermore, 
there is no suggestion that he is speaking of different types of 
criterion. So, we are left with the view that (a), (b), (c), and (d)
11.
are logically related. Now, on p83, of the review Malcolm says that 
a symptom of x might also establish the existence of x beyond question 
but in a different way, for it could not be contradictory to suppose
the symptom of x occurred without x. If we interpret (a) in this
way, it seems to imply (d). Again, (b) follows somewhat trivially 
from (a), if we assume that one cannot be said to have learnt a 
concept unless one knows what would settle the question of its 
applicability. (I interpret "do not" in (b) as meaning "cannot"; for 
if it means "need not" the implication is valid provided there is only 
one criterion for the use of the expression). Similarly, if we adopt 
this concept of learning, (a) might seem to imply (c), if we assume
that to elicit what would show that someone knows what would settle
a question, is to elicit what would settle the question, a reasonable 
assumption in the case of teaching the meaning of a word. But we 
must also assume that the only way that the question whether p 
could be settled is by the criterion being satisfied. (As we have 
seen, Malcolm means by (a) that if the criterion is accepted as 
satisfied, then it will make no sense to suppose that p is false.)
Thus to specify any circumstances incompatible with not-p is to 
specify a criterion for p. We have replaced a conditional by a 
biconditional (a requirement of any adequate definition).
Are we now ready to formulate a definition covering Malcolm's 
exgesis of Wittgenstein's use of "criterion"? There remains the 
difficulty that propositions (a) to (f) speak of the criterion, yet 
Malcolm repeatedly speaks of a plurality of criteria for things. It 
would seem then that Malcolm's understanding of the terra criterion 
must be expressed as follows: A criterion for p is satisfied if and
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only if the question whether p is settled in the affirmative; that 
is, if one accepts that the criterion is satisfied, it is contradictory 
to suppose that not-p. As v/e have seen, the claim that a criterion 
is satisfied is, on Malcolm's view, defeasible.
With this definition in mind, let us return to our suggestion 
that Malcolm stresses one criterion of dreaming to the exclusion of 
others. The phenomena which fit Malcolm's account with difficulty 
suggest other criteria such as troubled sleep, talking in sleep, and, 
generally, behaviour paradigraatically associated with waking life,
•if encountered in a sleeper. Malcolm maintains that such occurrences 
function as criteria of wakefulness. Perhaps so, under certain 
circumstances. But the claim that a man is awake because he is walking 
is defeasible - if he is unaware of his surroundings, if he suddenly 
starts, looks around and exclaims, "Where am I?", the claim might be 
rejected. This brings to a head the problem of a conflict of criteria. 
Malcolm recognizes that criteria might conflict ("Dreaming" p23)* How 
is this to be reconclied with the claim that the satisfaction of the 
criterion of p is incompatible with not-p? On p23, he distinguishes 
the criterion of behaviour for someone's being asleep from that of 
testimony. ("Whether an adult person is asleep may be determined 
by his being or not being able to report, later on, various present 
happenings in his vicinity") Malcolm's solution is to say that both 
criteria are applicable but they do not have equal weight (p23). For 
"the criterion of testimony has no application to animals and human 
infants". And someone might be unable to report what went on at a 
previous time though failure of memory. Malcolm concludes that the 
criterion of testimony is merely supplementary to that of behaviour.
The definition offered above fits this supplementary criterion only
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if we assume that in cases where the supplementary criterion is 
overruled, we are dealing with cases where it is not in fact satisfied 
("a criterion is satisfied only in certain circumstances").
What are the consequences of this for the view that there are 
criteria for dreaming other than Malcolm allows? The suggestion is 
that X, Y, Z...during sleep might be criteria of dreaming, not that 
the absence of any of them is a criterion of not-drearaing. But, as 
far as I can see, Malcolm regards non-satisfaction of his criterion 
as a criterion of not-dreaming. (Consider his remarks on dreams 
and dream-reports not being logically independent.) If we attempt 
to introduce extra criteria alongside Malcolm's criterion and this 
assumption, we will have the possibility of a conflict of criteria.
We will have to say that these extra criteria are satisfied only in 
certain circumstances i.e. when Malcolm’s criterion is satisfied.
They would thus be redundant. To make room for new criteria we 
must reject this assumption. Malcolm is probably led to this 
assumption by a natural unwillingness to leave it open whether there 
are an indefinite number of dreams we never khow about. We have a 
vicious circle in which his initial step of suggesting only one 
criterion commits him to an analysis which will not accommodate any 
more. And the barrier is reinforced by his tendency to regard the 
phenomena that might be taken as further criteria of sleep, as proof 
of wakefulness.
This attempt to avoid Malcolm's counter-intuitive conclusions 
still has affinities with Malcolm's approach. There are, however, more 
radical solutions which might be proposed, involving a rejection 
of Malcolm’s notion of "criterion". I shall discuss two possible
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approaches - (a) Malcolm's treatment of the criteria for X as 
demarcating the concept of,X, it is suggested, does not take account 
of language and concepts as entities which develop. (Putnam in 
"Dreaming and Depth Grammar" in "Analytical Philosophy" (1st series) 
ed. Butler) (b) The concept of "criterion" is rejected as not 
representing a genuine feature of language. As regards ^a;, it is 
helpful to examine the features of Malcolm's analysis which provoke 
it. Malcolm tries to proscribe such claims as that we can tell from 
a sleeper's bodily movements that he is having a violent dream^by the 
thesis that dreams can be said to have occurred only when the sleeper 
has been sound asleep (Ch.13). He writes lp28) "To say that a sleep­
walker, a person in a hypnotic trance and someone having a violent 
nightmare are 'asleep' is to make a natural extension of the use of 
that word beyond its primary use;" and "Nor would a man who was tossing 
about, crying out and groaning in the throes of a nightmare be a 
good example of a person asleep." This seems wrong; the man would be 
a good example of a certain type of sleep, and would find a place 
in a representative selection of examples of sleep. One could not 
adequately characterize the notion of sleep by one example. He would 
also be a good example of someone having a nightmare, and therefore 
of someone having a certain kind of dream. The stipulative nature 
of Malcolm's thesis is remarkable in view of the accusations he levels 
against empirical psychologists, who, he says, irising such phenomena 
as rapid eye-movernents as criteria of dreaming are merely making 
stipulations, and failing to refer to our concept of dreaming. Whereas 
Dement and Kleitman are, according to Malcolm, altering our concept 
of dreaming by extending it, Malcolm seems to be unduly restricting 
it. An analysis which imposes an excessive limitation on the range 
of phenomena which can be called dreams seems to do more violence to
15.
our concept of dreaming than does the introduction of new criteria.
Why is this? Does the concept permit the sett/ing up of new criteria 
in certain cases, without one having to say we are "transforming 
the concept in such a way that our subsequent discoveries do not 
pertain to dreaming"? (p82) Malcolm would reject this possibility 
on the grounds that the new "criteria" would not satisfy conditions
(b) and (c) which we noted in discussing his use of "criterion". But 
to maintain (b) and (c), Malcolm has to show that one cannot be said 
to have learnt a concept, until one knows what would settle the 
question of its applicability; furthermore, in the case of a plurality 
of criteria, he must allow that one cannot be said to have learnt a 
concept, until one knows all the criteria, all the things that settle 
the question whether the concept is applicable. Both these premises 
are questionable, and neither is demonstrated by Malcolm. Bather than 
argue specifically against them, I shall turn to the second objection 
that might be argued against Malcolm, a denial that language is 
criterion-governed in his sense; this should render further discussion 
of the first objection unnecessary.
Let it be admitted that we know a dog when we see one; but hov/ 
many of us could state what would settle (in Malcolm's sense) the 
question whether something is a dog? The task seems of the same order 
of difficulty as defining a dog. A child repeatedly has dogs pointed 
out to him, and perhaps other things designated as not dogs; eventually 
he learns to use the word to the satisfaction of his teachers. One 
might say that some aspect of the object pointed to is a criterion 
of dog-hood. (Wittgenstein is similarly vague in "Philosophical 
Investigations" §354: "there is rain when we have certain sensations 
of wet and cold, or such-and-such visual impressions"). But if one
16.
is to describe the object, so as to elicit what would settle the 
question whether it is a dog, one must eliminate this vagueness 
(cf."Investigations" §§101-10?). Malcolm is right to suppose that 
we normally tell whether someone possesses the concept "dog", by 
seeing whether he applies it to and only to dogs. But this gets 
us no further in the search for what would settle the question whether 
something is a dog. To say that people agree in the use of the word 
"dog", is not to say^use or could produce criteria of dog-hood.
Malcolm might claim that some concepts are criterion-governed 
in his sense and among these is the concept of dreaming. Do we know 
what would settle the question whether someone was dreaming? It 
is neither necessary nor sufficient that he should awaken with a 
delusive memory-irnpression. So, if Malcolm is to support his view, 
he must either produce another satisfactory criterion, or some argument 
to show that dreaming must be critefion-governed. The first he does 
not do; but he does suggest the argument (p60) that if there is no 
way of settling whether a concept is applicable, then there can be no 
sense in the idea of its being correctly used. But this, though 
plausible, as regards the ordinary sense of "settle", is not so 
as regards Malcolm's sense. One sees something one takes to be a 
dog; others agree; one is certain it is a dog. This is not to say 
that one cannot imagine evidence that could come to light to refute 
this view (eg. if the supposed dog were taken apart and found to 
be an ingenious arrangement of clock-work. Cf. Wittgenstein §84). 
Malcolm, as we have seen, admits a related point, that the propositions 
describing the criterion for p , do not logically imply p, as a 
criterion is satisfied only under certain circumstances, the list of 
countervailing circumstances being indefinite. Malcolm’s view would
17.
seem to be this; though there may be criteria for p, there need not 
be criteria for the satisfaction of the crtieria for p - an admission 
that much of our language is not criterion-governed. If we require 
that questions as to the correct use of a concept can be answered 
only if the applicability of a concept in a particular case can be 
settled (in Malcolm's sense) we must conclude that we could never 
know that someone was using a concept correctly. Malcolm can only 
consistently demand the existence of first-order criteria, if he is 
prepared to do the same for second-order criteria. (This will lead 
to a regress.) Wittgenstein rejects the idea of a private ostensive 
definition on the grounds that there could then be no distinction 
between using a word correctly and thinking one was doing so. If one 
had a rule^to determine the correct application of a word, one 
would need another to determine the correct application of the rule, 
and so on. But in the case of a public language, the correct use 
of a word is shown in the practice of following it in particular 
cases. Wittgenstein's idea can be applied here: one must notj/think
that every identificatiom of an object requires the application 
of tke criteria , for then the identification of the correct application 
of the criteria would demand further criteria. The regress is 
vicious owing to one's insistence on the need for criteria. See 
"Investigations" §201-202, §208, §292, §380. Many other doctrines 
of Wittgenstein, the account of family resemblance (§63et.seq.), 
the attack on the idea of cr^ rtc^ iliAe ®^o?^îanguage (§89 et.seq) 
and the idea of agreement in judgement (%242) emphasise the primacy 
of people agreeing in practice, as against the logical prejudice 
that language is governed by verbal definitions or formulable rules.
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It might be objected: does not my interpretation of
Wittgenstein minimise the centrality of the notion of "criterion" 
in his philosophy? Consider, for example, various passages in 
which Wittgenstein speaks of criteria:-
(a) Blue Book pp24-25* "If medical science...defining criteria 
of angina."
(b) "Investigations" pp222-223. "Assuming that dreams...are 
distinct from ’truthfulness' here".
(c) "Investigations" §353
These, and indeed other passeges, might all be taken as talking 
about the criterion we use in handling a particular concept, as reportive 
statements about criteria. (a) refers to a particular rule laid 
down by certain people. (b) works out the consequences of accepting 
a certqin state of affairs as the criterion of dreaming, and there 
is a suggestion (in my view, questionable) that this is the only one 
relevant as regards eliciting important information about the dreamer.
In (c) it is claimed j/tha^khe fact that the false appearance is 
precisely one of rain is founded on a definition", and clearly this 
definition is seen as reportive. Now (a) presents no difficulty.:, 
a rule is laid down for convenience by people working in a field 
where ordinary language might not provide adequate terminology. A 
stipulation for the sake of uniformity gains general acceptance, 
and assumes the status of a reportive definition. (b) is a matter 
of delimiting the concept of dreaming, presumably to focus attention 
on what is deemed important. The way is not barred to the use of 
other criteria of dreaming, or of the report's agreeing with the 
dream, if this is thought necessary. As regards (c), I think 
Wittgenstein would agree with the following: "that certaihosensations .,,
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are taken as criteria of rain" is founded upon definition, but 
upon ostensive definition, and, therefore, upon agreement in a 
practice. If a new phenomenon were discovered eg. something that 
looked like rain but could not be felt, we would be faced with the 
problem: which of the sensations, if either, do we take as establishing 
the occurrence of rain? A previous indeterminacy, which had produced 
no inconvenience before, would have to be rectified. Our answer, 
given on knowledge of science, might be obvious, but it would still 
be a decision; our language is not already so definite. Wittgenstein's 
arguments about rules, tell not against the possibility of criteria, 
but against this view that there is always a need for them. I think 
Wittgenstein would reject any attempt to say that ( as regards 
ordinary usage) it is raining if and only if such-and-such conditions 
are satisfied. But we can always specify criteria for greater 
precision, to introduce our own usage (§353) or to begin teaching 
someone a concept. And we can fix on different things as criteria 
for something at different times (§79)* And here, provided we remember 
the above restrictions, the definitions we have ascribed to Malcolm 
might well be adequate to Wittgenstein(s usage.
Another objection might be: does the notion of a practice
suffice, for how do we know agreement in usage will continue, and 
how could we settle any dispute, if the applicability of a word is 
not governed by definition? It is sufficient to refer the reader 
to Wittgenstein's treatment of the problem. In §183 he admits a 
dispute might arise, but we do generally agree in the use of words 
(§242); the logical possibility of a breakdown in agreement should 
not distract us (cf. §466 where a connection is made with the problem
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of induction); we do not choose our interpretation of rules (§386), 
any more than we choose to think (§46?) or reason that as fire
has burnt us before, it will burn us again (§323). "What has to be
accepted, the given, is - so one could say - forms of life."
The upshot of this excursus into the theory of criteria is that
we do not operate with criteria in the way Malcolm envisages. We 
may find it necessary to stipulate criteria for a particular purpose 
but this is not to offer an analysis of dreaming. In a very broad 
sense, Malcolm is right to accuse Dement and Kleitman of altering 
our concept of dreaming, but because they are fixing criteria, not 
because they are using the wrong ones. There is no sting in this 
accusation, as every science changes some of our ordinary concepts 
to make them precise enough for scientific use. (Compare our notion 
of water with that of the chemist.) It would be less tendentious 
to describe Dement and Kleitman as developing or modifying, rather 
than altering, our concept. The significance of our earlier attempt 
to improve upon Malcolm's analysis by allowing for the admission of 
more criteria was that it foreshadowed our conclusion that criteria 
are essentially stipulative, used on a particular occasion for a
/j
particular end. But it is better to avoid explicitly any suggestion 
that we are dealing with the criteria of dreaming.
Our analysis of dreaming may look a good deal less like the 
philosopher’s ideal of what a conceptual analysis should be. But 
we need not reject the distinction between evidence being empirically 
discovered, and its being evidence by definition, provided we remember 
that it is because the world is as it is, that v/e have our concept
Footnotes
1. Moreover, our position is strengthened if it is not too heavily 
dependent upon a particular theory about meaning.
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of dreaming and "that what today counts as an observed concomitant of 
a phenomenon will tomorrow be used to define it", (§79) So far, we 
have given a number of arguments against Malcolm having the form 
"Our concept of dreaming allows sense to such-and-such a notion; 
Malcolm’s analysis does not ". Let us assemble the main difficulties 
our analysis must avoid. It raust:-
(a) Allow the possibility of a dream recapitulating a waking 
experience.
(b) Make sense of the notion of a recurring dream.
Lc) Elucidate the connection between dreaming and sleeping.
(d) Show how a dream is ascribed to a particular period of sleep.
(e) Distinguish between remembering a dream, and having an 
apparent memory which is not veridical.
(f; Attach sense to the notion of a dream occurring during some 
stretch of time. It should not seem that the fact that 
a person who tells a dream is described as "having dreamed" 
is a mere accident, nor should the use of the continuous tense
(g) Answer the question whether one can have dreams one never 
remembers.
(h) Evaluate the status of details of a dream we have forgotten, 
though we remember the dream as a whole.
(i) Allow a sleeper's bodily movements to afford evidence that 
he is dreaming.
(j) Allow that external stimuli can modify the content of a dream 
and give some account of the relation between the two.
(k) Show what kind of memory-irapressions are candidates for 
being memories of dreams.
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There is a pitfall which is likely to be encountered here: we
allow that a dream might never be remembered, but do we wish to allow 
that there might be a race of people who dream but never remember 
their dreams? Similar questions can be raised concerning (a), (b) and 
(j). Thus we might say that a paradigm of a dream would have the 
following features - (i) the report os of events that never occurred.
(ii) it is remembered on waking. (iii) it does not recur. (iv) its 
content is not influenced by events in the real world at the time 
of dreaming. If one wants to teach a child the word "dream** by 
waiting until he spontaneously tells a dream, the example chosen will 
have to satisfy conditions (i) and (ii). It would help if the 
example satisfied (iv) as one wants to distinguish dreaming fom the 
confused perception which often accompanies drowsiness. (This is not 
to say that the two do not overlap, but that there are examples of 
the one quite different from examples of the other.)
It will be objected that much of what I say assumes what I 
have not shown, namely that dreaming is.a datable experience. The 
main obstacle to this view was Malcolm’s criteriologival approach.
But to remove an objection to a thesis is not to establish that 
thesis. Nor is it satisfactory to say, "Our concept of dreaming is 
of a datable experience; an analysis which does not treat it as such 
is wrong." It is possible that our ordinary notion os confused.
What v/e must do is, given the phenomena we take as evidence for dreaming, 
enquire v/hat dreaming must be like, if these phenomena are all 
evidence bfrthe^samei bhing, dreaming. Malcolm attaches great importance 
to the question: which of the evidence for dreaming is non-inductive 
evidence? Certainly, the evidence Malcolm takes as criteria is of
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this sort. But what of bodily movements in sleep? 6 sleeper’s 
bodily movements, and his later telling a dream are two separate 
things, and it is logically possible that there should be a correlation 
between them. This does not mean the correlation between a sleeper’s 
bodily movements and his dreaming is contingent, unless we assume thit 
the concept of telling a dream contains the whole of the concept 
of dreaming. If the correlation between dreaming and bodily movements 
during sleep is not contingent, then our concept of dreaming, in 
this respect, is founded on there being a correlation between bodily 
movements in sleep and the later telling of a dream; were this not 
so, we would not have the concept of dreaming we do have. But we can 
use both the telling of a dream, and a sleeper’s bodily movements as 
evidence for dreaming, without any views on what we would do if the 
correlation broke down. We would have to weigh the fact that we 
speak of animals dreaming, against the fact that dreaming is object- 
directed, about something.
Ought we then to avoid talk of inductive and non-inductive 
evidence? The question can, perhaps, best be answered by reference 
to Malcolm’s discussion of rapid-eye-raovements (REM). There was a 
time when these phenomena were unknown, and in no way part of the 
Concept of dreaming. When it was found that some periods of sleep 
were marked by these movements of the eye, experiments were devised 
to see if they were related to dreams. Subjects were awakened during 
periods of REM, and also when REM were absent. The incidence of 
dream-recall was high after the former, and low after the latter.
To use REM to predict that the sleeper could tell a dream on waking, 
would be to use REM as inductive for telling a dream, and hence
Footnotes.
1. I am speaking here of a general breakdown in the correlation.
We already recognize that not everyone who walks, talks, writhes 
or groans in his sleep later tells a dream.
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for dreaming. Thus at the time of these experiments there were no 
logical ties between dreaming and REM. Has the concept of dreaming 
changed since? Not for those v;ho have never heard of these 
experiments. But, as Kalcolm complains, psychologists have used REM 
as evidence for dreaming, in a manner not corrigible by the absence 
of a dream-report. One can say they have modified the concept of 
dreaming. But this modification is founded upon observed correlations. 
As we saw, Wittgenstein recognized this dynamic aspect of language 
in the “Investigations” (§79)• It is clearly possible to treat 
evidence as contingent and inductive, just as it is possible to 
treat something as a criterion. But it is the fact that there are 
correlations that is contingent; it is dangerous to dogmatize about 
the contingency or otherwise of the relation between these correlates 
and that for which they are each considered evidence (in this case, 
"dreaming”)•
If bodily movements during sleep count as evidence that the 
sleeper dreaming, and if his waking avowal counts as evidence that 
he has dreamed, this can only mean that dreaming is conceived as 
something -recurring during sleep, before waking. That is if our 
ordinary tense system can be trusted here: to say that x is y-ing 
is to say x is y-ing now, and to say x has y-ed is to say x has y-ed 
in the past. At one point, Malcolm seems/ïo®Scclpt this. "Our 
puzzlement over the criterion of dreaming is partly due to the fact 
that the sentence for which we want a criterion is in the past tense. 
How can a present occurrence, a person’s telling dream, be a criterion 
for something that happened previously, the dream? Well, why not?
If we abandon the assumption that the criterion and the something of
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which it is a criterion must be identical, then why cannot a present 
occurrence be the criterion of a past occurrence?” (p6l; But in the 
next chapter he writes, ”The locution that dreams eecur "in” sleep 
is used in this way: people declare on awakening that various
incidents took place (past tense) which did not take place. We then 
say that these incidents were dreamed (past tense;. This is merely 
how we label the above facts, which implies nothing about the 
occurrence of dreams in physical time.” (p77) He describes the view 
that dreams occur "in” sleep as due to one's "being carried away by 
spatial imagery". (I am unclear why he says "spatial", unless he 
feels the use of "in" is primarily spatial eg. "fish in the sea", 
and only metaphorically temporal eg. "in the afternoon".) Elsewhere,
(p23), he describes this view as an example "of what Wittgenstein 
calls a 'prejudice' produced by 'grammatical illusions'".
Now we employ the full gamut of tensed usages of the verb 
"dream". The verb "dream" is not defective. Moreover the variously 
tensed expressions mean different things. Malcolm is unable to 
account for the continuous present, except by making it some kind 
of analogy "with no clear sense" (animals) or a prediction (men).
If Malcolm's account is correct it is strange that we do not use a 
single word meaning "tell a dream” or at least the verb "tell a dream" 
alone, instead of an idiom which suggèsts another occurrence distinct 
from the telling of the dream. It would be interesting, though 
inconclusive, to investigate the idioms used to describe dreaming in 
a variety of languages to see hov/ umiveri-a! is the practice of 
distinguishing "dreaming" and "telling a dream”, and ascribing 
different tenses to each. But it is possible we use an idiom based
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on a false view of dreaming. We need concede no more than this; for 
it is our ordinary view that dreaming is an occurrence during sleep.
To see this we have only to reflect, that if we concluded that someone 
was dreaming on the basis of his bodily movements during sleep, v/e 
would not feel bound to retract this assertion if it were found that 
he had no dream to tell on waking, and indeed never remembered a 
dream which he ascribed to that period of sleep.
Concerning dreaming as an experience, we shall have«ore to 
say later. What concerns us here is dreaming conceived as a process 
distinct from bodily movements and the telling of a dream, that is 
as a process in time, with a beginning and an end - and involving 
change (not a state or condition). Consider the following argument: 
bodily movements are logically distinct from dreams; one can always 
occur without the other. Hence any correlation between the two must 
be contingent. But this requires that they be observed independently. 
But we hage, in setting up the premise, that dreams cannot
be directly observed. The argument seems to show that there can 
be no evidence for dreaming. iTje argument requires that we treat 
dreaming a^ iuuependent of waking testimony and prior to it, and 
here it seems even more conclusive as we have a temporal separation).
If it was too facile to speak of dreaming as logically distinct from 
bodilÿ movements in sleep and waking testimony, how are we thn to 
avoid identifying dreams with bodily movements or waking testimony?
I do not see how Malcolm distinguishes dreams from the false memory- 
impressions we have on waking. He asserts that by stating the criterion 
for something, we do not state what that something is. But his 
analogy with a sore foot does not hold, as here we can state what
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a sore foot is, whereas Malcolm not only does not say that a dream 
is, but dimisses the question as senseless. Morèover, the behavioural 
criteria Malcolm mentions are of someone's having a sore foot, not 
of something’s being a sore foot. It is not obvious that a person’s  ^
behaviour and condition is not to be identified with his having 
a sore foot; nor that a foot in a certain physical condition that 
causes such-and-such behaviour in its owner/not a sore foot.
If dreaming were a specialist concept of the sciences, we might 
meet the following account: dreaming is an unobservable occurrence
contemporaneous with certain bodily movements during sleep and prior 
to the telling of the dream. Such an approach has its merits, but 
it is intuitively odd. We are not aware of having made such an 
inference but have simply learnt the use of the word "dream". 
Furthermore, "the plain man" would take exception to the phrase 
"unobservable occurrence". - Does he not dream every night, the might 
say, yet this argument purports to treat dreaming as something of 
which we have no direct experience? This remark, involving the idea 
of dreaming as something experienced and recalled on waking, 
encapsulates the oddness of treating dreaming as a scientific construct; 
it would be well to avoid such a radical solution, though it is 
important in drawing attention to the fact that it is because the 
world is as it is (there are certain correlations) that we have the 
concept of dreaming we do.
The argument purporting to show that there is no evidence for 
dreams may seem familiar; it recalls the arguments that objects cannot 
exist unperceived, that one cannot know the mind of another, that there
28.
is no justification for claims about the past. We seem to make 
dreaming unobservable by definition and then learn# that it cannot 
be observed. Unfortunately, if we regard a dream as an experience, it 
seems that usually at least, it is not recognized as such whilst one 
is having it. This seems to make dreams, in one sense, unobserved - 
the status of a dream is ascribed to an experience ex post facto. We 
have decided that it is necessary that there occur both certain types 
of bodily movement during sleep, and the phenomenon of telling a dream, 
and correlations between them, if our concept of dreaming and not 
something similar is to be applicable. But is it sufficiént? If 
dreaming is conceived, as the working of the imagination during 
sleep, it seems insufficient. Trivially, if dreaming is something 
other than a sleeper's bodily movements, or his telling a dream, then 
its occurrence cannot be logically inferred from them. But this 
conclusion itself is not trivial. We must enquire whether it could 
conceivably turn out that dreaming, in our sense, does not occur.
Suppose a drug were discovered that produced a phenomenon 
resembling telling a dream: when injected with this drug, a person
finds he ha^ a memory-impression of events that never Docurred. This 
can be done '^ t -hor when he is awake, or when he is asleep; in the 
latter case, he immediately awakes and "tells a dream”, and is 
quite satisfied with the view that he dreamed the events he recalls.
It is later learnt that this chemical is produced in the body 
immediately before a sleeper awakes in all and only those cases in 
which he has a dream to tell on waking. Furthermore, if a substance 
/c(èlîroyi^ï§îl^c4?mical is injected into the sleeper, he invariably 
has no dream to tell. It would be concluded that the drug was closely 
connected with the phenomenon of dreaming. It would also look as if
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the drug caused the sleeper to wake with non-veridical memories.
Would we abandon the idea that the sleeper had certain mental 
experiences, which he recalled on waking? Or would we say that such 
experience occurred, but that the release of the chemical vas necessary 
to their being remembered? On the latter view, if it were shown that 
the chemical had no effect on one's ability to remember real events, 
we would have to assume that it acted only on dream-memory traces.
This seems somewhat ad hoc, particularly in view of the fact that 
the point of regarding dreams as experiences recalled on waking, 
is to assimilate the remembering to our remembering of events in 
waking life, and to regard the experience itself as the factor wherein 
the difference from waking experience lies. We might, therefore, 
abandon the belief that anything fundamental in dreaming occurs 
until immediately prior to waking. The sleeper's bodily movements, 
and external events which modify the content of the later dream-report 
could be dealt with by allowing them to have some causal influence 
on the release of the chemical later, and on the subsequent dream 
telling. It seems possible, therefore, to conceive of experimental 
results which would suggest a theory of dreaming in which the telling 
of the dream was causally determined by events immediately prior to 
waking, and in which reference to events earlier in sleep, played 
only a minor role ( and references to experiences in sleep no role 
at all).
The realisation of the above possibility would be a vinaicauion 
of i.alcolrn in the following sense only: it is because we have loosened
the ties between "telling a dream" and dreaming, he would say, that 
the existence of dreams seems problematic - he is not denying the
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existence of dreams. Our use of a disjunction of states of affairs 
counting as evidence for an experience during sleep leads us to 
treat the existence of dreaming as a hypothesis corrigible by further 
scientific advance. To progress beyond this point we need to take 
account of our conviction that when we tell a dream we are recalling 
experiences we had in sleep. Here I ought to warn the reader that I 
do not think it is possible to prove that the above situation could 
not arise, that much of our concept of dreaming could not be called 
in question by experimental results. A sympathetic account of Malcolm 
might take the form of treating his results as an analysis of what 
would remain of our concept of dreaming after such a discovery,
'I
of the invulnerable element in our concept of dreaming.
On p31 of "Dreaming", Malcolm writes that many philosophers
"have thought that when one dreams, one reasons, judges, imagines,
has sense-impressions, and so on, while asleep...in the same sense
2
that people do or have them when awake ...If it is theoretically 
impossible to verify that someone had images, say, in his sleep, 
but possible to verify that he dreamed, then a dream cannot be 
identical with, nor composed of, images experienced during sleep."
One of his reasons for asserting this to be a theoretical impossibility 
is that (p31), "to learn...that a certain event occurred in a dream 
is not to learn that the event took place while one slept; but just 
the reverse, namely that the event did not take place at all." But 
if someone had a dream in which he saw a man felling a tree, even 
if this implies he did not see a man felling a tree, it does not 
imply that he did not have the experience of seeing a man felling 
a tree. Malcolm might say that "He dreamed he saw a man felling a
Footnotes
1. This is, of course, to do much less than to give an account of.
our concept of dreaming as it is now.
2. He does not specify any criterion of sameness of sense,
presumably as he intends to show that there is iro sense in 
which one has these experiences in sleep.
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tree" implies "He dreamed he had the experience of seeing a man 
felling atree". To rebut this, we need to show that there is no 
ground for supposing that "He dreamed he had the experience of p" 
implies "He did not have the experience of p". This I hope to show 
later. Malcolm has other arguments that one cannot have experience® 
(eg. of images, sense-impressions etc.) while asleep, but I shall 
not consider these yet; my reason for quoting Malcolm here is to 
bring into focus the problem about the meaning of the claim th&t 
dreaming is an experience. Satisfied he has shown that a dream 
cannot be composed of thoughts, images etc., he continues, "I was 
inclined at one time to think of this result as amounting to a proof 
that dreaming is not a mantal activity or a mental phenomenon or 
a conscious experience. But now I reject that inclination. For 
one thing, the-^phrases'mental activity', 'conscious experience', 'mental 
phenomenonV^are so vague that I should not have known what I was 
asserting...For another thing, a good many philosophers tend to use 
these phrases more or less as technical expressions, and they would 
be inclined to stipulate that dreams are mental phenomena or conscious 
expressions."
Malcolm's doubts about the precision of terms like "mental 
phenomenon" and "mental activity" may be justified, although the 
latter does carry the implication of more than a merely passive state. 
But ought "conscious experience" to be bracketted with them^ To say 
dreaming is a conscious experience does seem to have definite 
implications
(a) we attach sense to the notion of a dream occurring in physical 
time.
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(b) we attach sense to the notion of details of a dream which
we have forgotten, though we remember the dream as a whole.
(c) external stimuli can modify the content of the dream at 
the time of the stimulus.
(d) the dream is remembered later.
(e) in dreams one might have images.
(f) there are certain values of p for which "He dreaméd that p" 
implies not that p is false, but that p is true. Perhaps,
if p is "he was in pain" and dreaming is a kind of experience,-
one is assenting he had an^ experience of being in pain, 
which seems to mean he was in pain.
(g) one might compare a waking experience to a dream, sayigg it 
had dream-like quality.
(h) when dreaming, one judges, reasons and imagines. (Possibly 
a defect of the experience-terminology is that it makes 
dreaming too passive.)
(i) there is a gradation of intermediate cases between dreaming
on the one hand and waking images or visual hallucinations 
on the other - hypnogogic imagery.
These rather diverse claims can be unified by sonsidering the 
"logic" of statements about dreams. We have seen that Malcolm 
ascribes similar logical features to dreams as to narratives. One 
aspect of this is that one can, he thinks, dream what is senseless 
or contradictory (the waking report might contain a senseless sentence). 
But if someone says he dreamed that p, but p is senseless, he has 
failed to specify what he dreamed. An attemptefio describe in more 
detail what was dreamed would either break down or change over to
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something coherent. Maybe I understand the story that Moore dreamed 
he could not distinguish propositions from tables, but what if he 
claimed to have dreamed that propositions are tables? We cannot 
explain what it is for propositions to be identical with tables, and 
then add that the supposition is senseless. ("Investigations"i300) 
Possibly statements of the form "He dreamed that p" where p is
nonsensical can be understood as something else, say, "He dreamed
']
that 'p' made sense to him"") Or perhaps "He dreamed he squared 
the circle" can be explicated by a fuller description of what he 
dreamed which does not contain contradictory elements. Some such 
approach is needed to explain cases where we seem to have to say we 
can understand "He dreamed that p" without understanding "p".
Once one has limited what one can dream to the logically possible 
(what one can dream is not anything that can be uttered) one is close 
to limiting dreaming to what would conceivably be experienced. To 
avoid entanglement in the controversy over the possibility of 
synthetic a priori knowledge, 1 shall try to make the transition to 
the latter claim rather differently. If someone were to say that 
he dreamed p, where p does not describe anything that could be 
experienced, we should be puzzled as to why, among other things, he 
claimed to have dreamed it. The problem would not arise if his claim 
was that he dreamed he speculated about the meaningfulness of truth of 
"p"; nor if his claim was simply that he speculated about the meaning­
fulness or truth of "p". From this it is but a short step to saying 
that one can only dream what could occur in physical time, that one 
can only dream what one could also judge, believe, imagine etc. This 
is all consonant with the claim that dreaming is a species of experiencing 
but does not imply it. If we are ready to make this assimilation, 
Footnotes
1. Malcolm would have to allow this sort of move, in his own account, 
if he is to give sense to "He dreamed he was dreaming".(An 
assertion sometimes heard) for if we apply^"He dreamed that p, 
only if not-p" this becomes a kind of antimony. Furthermore, 
in his discussion of someone dreaming that Westminster Abbey was 
1 burnt do
Malcolm justifies the use of "Someone «Irear^ ied
destroyed by fire, and waking to learn that it had been wn 
during night (p64)
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the theses listed above fit in with ease. If dreaming is itself 
a mode of experience,' we must add to our claim that one can only 
dream what one could also experience the phrase "without dreaming".
(We can experience various things and there are various types of 
experience but the content of the experience is not itself sufficient 
to allocate the experience to the realm of learning. This, I think, 
is part of the truth in the claim that in dreams one is often deluded 
or deceived.; Malcolm produces various arguments vohapter 6; against 
conceiving dreams as experiences, and against the view thzat one can 
judge, presuppose, have images in sleep. (1) A criterion we use to 
establish someone as asleep is that he does not exhibit signs of 
awareness. Anything that would show he v/as having images, judging etc 
would go to show he was awake. (2) We could never give a sense to 
the notion of someone's doing these things in a dream as we could 
never establish that such expressions were being correctly used.
(3) To^say someone made a judgement in a dream is to say he dreamed 
he made a judgement, which is not to say he made a judgement, but 
to deny it. This last objection begs the question: if we recognize
that dreaming is an experience we can admit either the possibility 
of making a judgement whilst dreaming, without the making of the 
judgement being part of the dream , or the argument that if dreaming 
is an experience in time, then the experience of which it is comp&ed 
must actually have occurred, and these experiences might turn out to 
include judgements. As regards the first objection, even if Malcolm’s
Footnotes
1. Malcolm ascribes^mobility to the word "dreamy believing, no
doubt, that "in a dream" must always mean "as part of a dream", 
never "whilst dreqming". As I shall later argue, this would be 
unexceptionable were it not combined with the view that "He 
dreamed that p" entails "not-p", for it is only then that one 
would want to appeal to the possibility of the latter sense of 
"in a dream."
cont. from p33«
that Westminster Abbey was destroyed by fire", by an appeal to a
more detailed account of the dream-narrative.
35.
account of our evidence for someone’s being asleep is adequate, the 
poss
possibility still remains that one could judge something in sleep, 
without there being any external manifestations at the time. To 
this Malcolm would oppose the second objection ((2) above). One 
could only use the waking memory as evidence of judgements in sleep, 
if one could give sense to the notion of judgements in sleep. If 
one replied that the sense of "judging" etc. was the same as in waking 
life, Malcolm might counter with "Investigations" §350. To give 
sense to "judgement in sleep" we need to be able to say what would 
count in favour of the applicability of the concept in a given case. 
And Malcolm would maintain that the waking report could only be 
evidence for one's having dreamed one made a judgement, which would 
imply that one did not make a judgement.
I shall maintain that Malcolm's claim that one cannot make a 
judgement when asleep is stipulative. This can be brought out as 
follows. On Malcolm's view we allocate events to the realm of 
dreams by noting that they did not occur. Suppose someone wakes 
and claims he made a judgement during the night, and suppose that 
this judgement was given no behavioural manifestations at the time. 
What evidence could we have that this did not occur? On Malcolm's 
view that thinking and sleeping cannot occur together there are two 
possibilities: either he made the judgement when he was awqke, or
he dreamed he made the judgement. Malcolm takes this view which 
might rest on a confusion of two theses - that a person's being 
conscious of the outside world is evidence for his being awake, and 
that a person's being conscious of anything is evidence for his being 
awake. The first seems plausible (though provisos will be added
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later) but does not give Malcolm his conclusion. The second, however, 
is a stipulation. For suppose we maintain that the man made a 
judgement in sleep, and offer as evidence his waking report. Malcolm, 
to deny that any such process occurred, would either have to say 
that the waking report was not really evidence, or that the judgement 
could not have occurred because the person was sleeping. The former 
line attributes to our memory an unreliability which we do not 
generally ascribe to it in the other cases eg. of one's own thought.
The latter involves a claim, that he was asleep, which we might not 
be able to make: we may not know the putative time of the judgement,
and even if we did, the person's bodily state at the time might have 
been too ill-defined for us to decide whether he was asleep. In 
this case, we need some independent means of knowing whether he was 
asleep. Thus the making of a non-avowed judgement cannot be used 
criterially to establish that someone is awake. And it is because 
Malcolm thinks that the making of a judgement is proof t&at someone 
is^asleep, that he maintains that one cannot make a judgement in sleep. 
Once this p±?op is removed, he is left with a mere stipulation.
Let us nov; examine Malcolm's claim that evidence for someone's 
being conscious of the outside world counts against the assertion 
that he is asleep. On p22, Malcolm says that if it is required to find 
out whether someone was asleep, we look for "things of this sort: that
he is recumbent, his eyes are closed, his breathing regular, his 
body mainly inert and that he does not react to various sounds and 
movements in his vicinity.” To the above (the criterion of behaviour) 
he adds the criterion of testimony - "whether an adult person is 
asleep now may be determined by his being or not being able to report, 
later on, various present happenings in his vicinity." He admits thA
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"between the two poles "awake" and "asleep" there is much room for 
qualification. What we do in such cases is to make a qualified 
assertion that a person is asleep eg. It's a restless sort of sleep; 
he is tossing about". On p23 Malcolm speaks of the degree to which 
a person is awake : if someone who had earlier seemed to be asleep
were asked about thunder that had occurred^uring that time, and
u
replied that it was loud, it would have been determined that he was 
sufficiently awake to hear that sound...It is as if we first asserted 
that he is asleep and then added a modifying clause like *but he is 
moaning*, the effect of which is to subtract something from the 
assertion...A man who is shielding his eyes from the light,standing
I I
up or answering a question is in those respects not asleep. Malcolm 
distinguishes one important ascription of sleep, that of being sound 
asleep, used to make an unqualified assertion that someone is asleep, 
that the criteria of inertness and unresponsiveness are fully 
satisfied. He adds that we also use "He is sound asleep" in a 
narrower sense to mean that it will be difficult to awaken the person. 
The two senses of "sound asleep" do not entail each other.
Malcolm concentrates on the distinction between sleegp and 
wakefulness. It is also important to distinguish sleep from the 
other states such as unconsciousness and death. The mention of 
breathing among Malcolm's behavioural eriteria rules out the last 
possibility. To mark the distinction from unconsciousness, one 
needs to include a clause about the ease of waking. One normally 
tries to awaken someone by making a noise in his vacinity or shaking 
him. If such raanoevres, vigourously employed, fail, one concludes 
he is not asleep, but drugged or stunned. But Malcolm seems to
38.
assume that the less one reacts to stimuli or the more intense 
such stimuli must be to produce a reaction, the deeper is one's 
sleep. TO say of a sleeper, who hears a rumble of thunder in one 
night, that he is "sufficiently awake" to hear that sound, rather 
than "sufficiently sensitive to his environment" begs the question 
in favour of the view that awareness of the world and depth of sleep 
vary inversely. Malcolm admits that this might be so in the following 
passage (p32) concerning someone who does not respond to moderate 
sounds in his vicinity, but is awakened by some specific sound 
eg. the whispered words "Time to get upi". He writes, "There is an 
inclination to think that a person can be awakened in this way only 
if he is already partly awake, since he appears to be discriminating 
between sounds...But this inclination is in error; the criteria 
for his having heard the other sounds - namely, his behaviour and 
testimony - are not satisfied." Here, unless we adopt the view which 
Malcolm thinks erroneous, that all the sounds are heard, we find that 
the relationship between the intensity of stimuli to which one reacts 
and one's depth of sleep, is more complex than Malcolm elsewhere 
suggests. The above passage is notable for another tacit acknowledgement 
of a point which tells against Malcolm's view. He speaks of someone 
being described as asleep because he does not regpoiid to moderate 
sounds.
Now Malcolm claims that to call someone "sound asleep" is to 
say "that the criteria of inertness, unresponsiveness and so forth 
are satisfied as well as can be". But if someone who seems sound 
asleep can be awoken by shouting in his ear, or beating him, it is 
possible to imagine someone who cannot, and ought on this account to 
be described as evdn more soundly asleep. Malcolm does produce his
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distinction between "sound asleep" meaning "difficult to awaken" 
and meaning "satisfying the criteria of sleep as well as possible."
But as the criteria Kalcolm gives include unresponsiveness to stimuli 
(such as might be used to awaken him) the two meanings overlap. Kalcolm 
is able to write (pp31-32) "It is possible that a person who is not 
sound asleep in the first sense (eg. he is walking in his sleep) 
should be sound asleep in the second sense", because he is separating 
the criterion of inertness from that of unresponsiveness,though both 
are supposed to be criteria of sleep in the first sense. The criteria 
of inertness and unresponsiveness must not be too well satisfied, 
otherwise the person in question is judged not asleep but "out cold" - 
one cannot assume a law of direct proportion between inertness and 
unresponsiveness on the one hand and aoundness of sleep on the other. 
Although Malcolm acknowledges this, he does not integrate it into 
the rest of his theory - most notoriously, when he maintains that 
people who respond to stimuli eg. by weaving them into a dream, 
are not fully asleep. But if someone who is definitely asleep can 
react to an external stimulus by awakening, surely he can do so in 
a milder way, by having a dream which is modified thereby? It might 
now appear that a person is asleep if inert and unresponsive to a 
certain degree, but the case of a person, who, although asleep, is 
sensitive to some specific sound though not to others, shows that 
even this view must be stated with circumspection. We cannot say 
he is sufficiently sensitive to react to the one sound but not to 
the other, unless we can show some gradation in the sounds such that 
only the one which awakened him lies beyond a certain limit. How do 
we ascertain how deeply asleep someone is? Malcolm answers that if 
many of the criteria are satisfied but not all, we say, "He is asleep,
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but...". He seems right here (though I am wary of the word "criterion") 
but this procédure does not lead directly to a scale of soundness of 
sleep, because of the many ways in which the states of sleepers can 
differ. It is also misleading to say that someone is sufficiently 
awake to react to such-and-such, because it suggests that it is 
due to his being partly awake that he so ^reacts - but we have seen 
that some degree of responsiveness is characteristic of sleep. When 
we say of someone that he is asleep, but certain typical features of 
sleep are not present, we do not necessarily wish to imply that he is 
only marginally an example of someone asleep, nor are we making a 
quantitative assertion analogous to quoting a distance, nor are we 
saying he is asleep in some respects but not in others. Malcolm 
sometimes uses the expression "not fully asleep", rather than "not 
soundly asleep". I am not sure that we ordinarily use this expression, 
but clearly it is in line with his treatment of cases where someone 
manifests some kind of awareness during sleep as irrelevant to the 
analysis of dreaming, which he associates with the state of being 
fully asleep. Malcolm needs to show that the concept of sleep can 
be explicated by reference to a paradigm, that one type pf sleep is 
sufficient to exemplify the concept of sleep, and that cases which 
diverge from the paradigm are irrelevant to the.analysis of sleep 
and of dreaming.
We have seen that Malcolm has not shown that evidence for 
someone’s being consdious counts against the claim that he is asleep, 
except in the case where "consciousness of the outside world" is 
referred to, and the preceding discussion has shown that even here, 
the situation is very much more complicated than Malcolm realises.
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One might wish to say that a sleeper is sensitive to his environment 
(eg. he can be awoken), but not conscious of his environment. But 
there will be many cases in which Malcolm could not use this criterially, 
as the decision whether someone is merely sensitive to his environment, 
or conscious of it, (eg. someone responding to a specific stimulus, 
but not to others) will require a priori identification of his state 
as either sleeping or waking.
Returning to the assertion that a person is conscious of his 
dreams, a terminological point (and I do not think it is anything 
more) arises here. In the case of "He dreamed about this bank-account",
do we say that the thought actually occurred but was part of his
dream, or that he thought whilst dreaming, the thought not being part 
of the dream? Now, our reason for calling this part of a dream 
would presumably be its forming part of a lengthier account, containing 
events known not to have been experienced by the speaker (at the time 
and place of dreaming). We could conceive of the dream as consisting 
of veridical and non-veridical parts, or alternatively, that the dream 
as contemporaneous or interspersed with non-dreaming experiences. The 
former seems more in accord with usage: we do speak of people
dreaming they thought something, without wishing to deny they thought 
it but merely wishing to date the thought as a substretch of a dream.
(On this view, locutions such as "He dreamed he thought..." and "He 
dreamed he v/as in pain", far from entailing "He did not think...", 
or "He was not in pain", entail their negations). The latter, however, 
seems to have little to recommend it, only deference to Malcolm’s
view that "He dreamed that p" entails "not-p", would lead us to
adopt it. Hence, to say that in a dream, one might judge, think.
42.
reason, be in pain etc. in the same sense as one might in waking
life is to say that the evidence for someone's doing these things in
a dream has similarities to that for his doing these things in waking
life. Thus, he remembers doing these things, and we accept his testimony,
When he dreams he is in pain, he uses no criteria to establish he
is in pain at the time. Furthermore, one can use the bodily
movements of a sleeper as evidence that he is dreaming he is in pain.
But there are differences - firstly there must be a reason to speak 
1 .
of dreaming : and secondly, we place greater weight on the testimony 
of the dream-teller than on that of one purporting to relate waking 
experiences. If someone said he dreamed that he thought grass was 
blue, we would be less likely to suspect him of lying than j.f he 
said he used to think that grass was blue.
Many of Malcolm's difficulties arise from his insistence that 
before we can assert "He dreamed that p" we must first discover that 
"not-p". It would be well to investigate how we do allocate 
experiences to the category of dreams. Suppose someone wakes in the 
morning and seems to remember locking the back-door on the previous 
night. It transpires that the back-door is not locked. In what 
circumstances would we say he dreamed he locked.the back-door? Firstly, 
there must be evidence that the door is unlocked because he did not 
lock it. But given that, we still would not automatically conclude 
he dreamed he locked the door. There might be circumstantial details 
which would incline ms to the contrary:- (a; On reflection, he might 
feel he only remembers locking the door on some occasion, not specifi- 
callyon the previous night. Perhaps he is in the habit of locking 
the door under broadly similar circumstances every night, and simply
Footnotes
1. If someone manifested pain-behaviour in sleep, we would be more 
likely to say he was dreaming he was in pain if there were no 
obvious physical cause for pain. If someone claims to have made 
a judgement in the night one wants to know whether he was asleep 
at the time before one says he dreamed it.
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remembers the usual pattern of events. In the extreme case, all his 
"memory" might amount to would be a conviction that he must have 
locked the door as he habitually does. (b) On reflection, he might 
conclude jUfhe only remembers events normally associated with locking 
the door. Common cases would be his deciding to lock the door, or 
going in the direction of the door. (c) There may be evidence that 
he was in no way fit to know what he was doing the night before.
Possibly, he attempted to lock the door, but failed without realising 
it. One might say he really remembers trying to lock the door. But 
he mistook an unsuccessful attempt for a successful one; so we must 
mention a false judgement. Clearly, evidence from outside observers 
would be needed to distinguish this from the following:- (d) His 
memory of the previous night might be unreliable, say, if he is under 
the influence of a drug which impairs the memory - if so, one ought 
to wait until he is not.
What conclusions may we draw from the above? Firstly, v/e must 
ascertain exactly what seems to be remembered, together with its 
alleged time. Secondly, we must distinguish what he thought happened, 
from what did happen. For if there is evidence that at the time of 
the alleged event, he thought that what he later seems to remember 
happening, was happening, then there is prima facie evidence that he 
did not dream it later. Thirdly, if someone claims to remember 
something that did not occur, then evidence that his memory is unreliable 
counts against the claim that he dreamed it. This tells against 
Malcolm's tendency to assimilate all cases of unveridical meraory- 
irnpressions to dream-reports. Perhaps Malcolm is thinlcing of 
"Investigations" p222, "The question whether... truthfulness here."
But Wittgenstein is saying that the reliability of one's memory in
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general is not normally called in question to impugn the accuracy 
of a dream-report, not that it irrelevant to deciding whether a 
certain raemory-report is a dream-report. Wittgenstein also seems 
to be suggesting that there is no notion of "forgetting" or "errors 
of memory" applicable to dreams; this is very dubious as I hope to 
show later.
Now let us conàidér what sort of facts might encourage us to
say that the person did dream that he locked the door. (a) If his
memory of locking the door formed part of a more general memory of
doing things both before and after locking the door, which he has
definite evidence he did not do, and particularly if this lengthier
account was is any way surrealistic. The notion of memory-impression
forming part of a series of meraory-impressions which together
constitute a whole, raises the problem: why regard the memory of
locking the door as connected with the rest. It is probably enough
for it to be remembered as part of the whole; certainly if the content
of the memory-irnpressions are related. (b) We might say he dreamed
he locked the door if his memory of locking it is somehow "off-colour”
eg. say, if he remembers locking it withthe wrong key. In many cases
thece might be a difficulty in speaking of his locking the back-door.
If the remembered appearance of the door were different from its
actual appearance, do we say he did not really lock that door,/Be 
dreamed he locked that door, but it seemed different in his dream?
I think we normally take the dreamer's account as the last word, and
if this is confused as regards criteria of identity this only confirms
us in the belief that he dreamed it. All we have attempted to do
is to examine the sort of thing we treat as evidence that a person
dreamed. They are not criterial in Malcolm's sense, nor do they
always provide us with a probabilistic judgement as to whether
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someone was dreaming. For if someone awoke with a definite but 
false impression that he locked the back-door, his menàal condition 
being normal on waking and the night before, and if he had no memories 
of other events which he connected with locking the door, and there 
were nothing surrealistic or "off-colour" about his memory-impression, 
then the above discussion furnishes no guidance as to whether he 
dreamed. It could only lead us to reserve our judgement, and in 
such a case, I submit that is just what we would do. An objection 
that might be used agaisnt the above account is that with sophisticated 
speakers, there is no process of inference - they have learnt the 
word "dream" and apply it directly on waking. This may usually 
be the case but one can conceive of situations where one is in doubt 
as to whether one dreamed something, or whether it actually happened. 
(There need be nothing unlikely in the events one dreamed in a dream- 
report.) This is common when the dream is not remembered until well 
after waking. I am inclined to agree with Malcolm tha& statements 
to the effect that one dreamed are basically inferential.
Suppose the examply had been that thy person awoke, seeming to 
remember going through the theorem of Pythagoras in his head during 
the night. Here there are these alternatives:- (a) He was awake 
and did so. (b) He was asleep and did so in a dream, (c) He falsely 
remembers having done so. For him to accept (b) he would need the 
following kind of evidence ;- the memory ought to be part of a 
more extensive memory-impression of a series of events,/Ma&en'as a 
whole, could not have happened, or it should be "off-colour" as 
regards, say, the mental state in which he remembers doing it. It 
would help to eliminate (c), if the person were heard talking in
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his sleep about the theorem, though we do not call in question a 
person's memory of private events without good reason. Normally 
the main candidates would be (a) and (b) . But the sort of evidence 
inclining us to the dream-hypothesis is evidence not for the event's 
never having occurred, but evidence associating it with events 
that did not occur, or evidence that the event did not occur in 
waking life eg. the man's not being in the habit of rehearsing 
geometrical theorems. And this does not support the view that a 
necessary condition of "He dreamed that p" is "not-p".
At this point we might take stock of our position: the way we 
speak of dreams, and the way we decide when a dream has occurred, 
presuppose dreams to be experiences in time, and an attempt has been 
made to bring out the implications of this* As I do not think it 
possible to prove that there is an event, the dream, prior to the 
waking report, then a fortiori I do not think it possible to prove 
that there is an experience, the dream, prior to the waking report.
But at least it seems not in conflict with what we know from observation. 
Earlier, we noted various conditions an acceptable account of dreaming 
must satisfy. Let us see how far we can meet these conditions.
Firstly, sense should be given to the notion of a dream 
recapitulating a waking experience. Under what circumstances would 
we say this had occurred. Suppose someone said, "You remember the 
time we had that car-crash?". Well, I dreamed about it in perfect 
detail last night." It might be objected: how do you distinguish
your present memory of the supposed dream from that of the event 
it is supposea to recapitulate? Now, often, an exact recapitulation
Footnotes
1. Though the intermediate state of falling asleep complicates 
matters. This should not worry us as we have argued that thinking 
and dreaming one thinks are not antithe^al.
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would not be claimed but only a close resemblance. But even here, 
some substretch of the dream might be perfectly recapitulatory. If 
the subject awoke momentarily thinking he had just been in a car- 
crash, and showing relief on discovering he was lying in bed, then 
we would accept his claim, however exact he claimed the recapitulation 
to be. Similarly, if in his dream he lad the feeling that it had 
all happened before. This helps us deal with the next condition, that 
we must allow the possibility of recurring dreams. For if the subject 
repeatedly awakens claiming to have had the same dream each time, 
the memory being especially vivid, and the realisation of where 
he is producing an emotional shock, we would agains accept his claim, 
even if it was that each dream was an exact recapitulation of the lâstt
Thirdly our account must show how a particular dream is ascribed 
to a particular period of sleep. A defect of Malcolm's analysis is 
his failure to account for the relationship between dreams and 
sleep. He writes in the following vein (p55)« "If after waking from 
sleep a child tells us...," and (p66), "When (the l^eeper) says'I 
dreamed so-and-so', he implies, first, that it seemed to him on 
waking, as if...". One is tempted to ask, "How long after sleeping - 
5 minutes, 5 hours, 5 days?" The importance of this question resides 
in two difficulties. Firstly Malcolm makes a reference to sleeping.
He does not say, "If after eating a child tells us etc.". Yet every 
recounting of a dream must follow a meal by some period of time.
Malcolm ascribes the dream to the sleeping, but on what grounds? 
Sedondly, we must ascribe dreams to particular periods of sleep, not 
merely to "sleep" in general. Malcolm does not regard dreaming as 
distinct from telling a dream as a datable occurrence. This causes
48.
some obscurity about the point of assigning dreaming to sleep', but 
more specifically rules out the following approach, open to anyone 
who treats dreaming as datable: in waking life, we can date the
occurrence of thoughts by reference to public phenomena, but not so
(usually) with parts of dreams. If we "remember" something that
never was, we would not regard this as a dream-memory; if we could
account for it by some delusive experience during consciousness.
Hence it is natural to assign dreams to times when we are not conscious 
of the outside world.
As regards the question why a particular dream is ascribed 
to a particular period of sleep, Malcolm could say that at least 
the telling of the dream is datable, and we could assign the dream 
to a period of sleep previous to the telling, perhaps the previous 
one. But is a stipulation what we require here? Might we just as 
well ascribe the dream to the penultimate period of sleep œfore 
recalling the dream? There would, then, be no sense in such questions 
as, "Did I dream that last night, or was it the night before, and I 
simply have not remembered it until today?" Malcolm's account could 
be applied qith little change, to'a'fpeople who never slept, but 
sometimes seemed to remember things that never actually occurred.
This makes the connection between sleeping and dreaming too slight. 
Malcolm might be able to defend himself against the charge of making 
the relation between sleep and dreaming merely contingent, say a causal 
link, by saying that the initial teaching situation requires the child 
to tell his dreams soon after waking - only when he has mastered the 
concept, could the child proceed to recognize that one might not recall 
a dream till well after one's last sleep (and the situation cannot
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occur too often if our concept of dreaming is to remain unchanged).
But this still leaves the connection between sleep and dreams unclear. 
Nor, on Malcolm's account, does it seem that we could significantly 
alter the concept, if we abandon the conceptual connection between 
sleep and dreams.
Our claim that dreaming is an occurrence during sleep makes 
the connection between dreaming and sleep explicit. But how ^  
we assign a dream to a particular period of sleep? Normally, if one
wakes with a vivid impression of having dreamed, or if one takes 
time to reàlize it was a dream, we assume it was during the sleep 
from which one has just awoken that one had the dream. We place 
great weight on the "feeling of having just dreamed"; this constitutes 
a family of cases involving beliefs and emotional states, md their 
dispersion soon after waking, and the vividness of the memory. If 
one remembers a dream only well after one's last sleep, we tend to 
assume, ceteris paribus, that the dream occurred in that sleep.
This is not a stipulation, but a hypothesis based on a certain amount 
of evidence - it is known that dreams are rapidly forgotten after 
waking"*, if they are not recorded immediately, or at least mentally 
rehearsed on waking. If a dream has not already been recallediÿ the 
chances that a dream will be remembered diminish with lapse of time. 
The possibility that one might dream and not recall it tilL after 
one has awoken, slept again, and reawoken cannot be ruled out. If 
I suddenly remember a certain dream for the first time and tell it 
to a friend, who tells me that it squares with what I uttered when 
talking in my sleep, not on the previous night, but on the night
Footnotes
1. To avoid begging the question, we might say that incidence of 
dream recall falls with lapse of time alter sleep.
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before that, we might consider such a hypothesis reasonable. The 
allocation of a dream to a period of sleep is a question of fact, 
remaining after we learn the time when the dream is first remembered.
The requirements that a distinction be drawn between telling 
a dream and reporting an event which never occurred, through a trick 
of the memory, and that sense be given to the notion of a dream 
occurring in physical time have already been considered. There remains 
the question of the duration of dreams as distinct from their location. 
Malcolm brings out the difficulties in this notion partly by citing 
the conflicting views that have been held on the matter (footnote 
to p79)« He feels this supports his view that the hypothesis that 
dreams haveidurationeissnonsensical. Do we have any reason to choose 
between hypotheses such as that dreams are instantaneous, that they 
last as long as the events in thedream would if they occurred in 
waking life, and that they fill the whole of the relevant period of 
sleep? Consider this puzzle case. A number of people are together 
and each notes the time, say three o'clock. One of them, so he thinks, 
leaves the room and carries out various tasks which seem to take an 
hour, then returns. Having taken up his previous position he notices 
the clock stands at one minute past three. Furthermore, his friends 
do not remember his leaving the room at all, the tasks he claims to 
have done have not been done, and he was talking convivially up 
till three o'clock. How would the man explain this experience to 
himself? Perhaps he had dozed off and dreamed: if during the crucial
sixty seconds, his friends noticed his eyes closed and his exhibiting 
the usual signs of sleep, it would be assumed he had a dream - which.
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if we ascribe a duration to it, could not have lasted more than sixty 
seconds. Suppose this is not the case. Perhaps, he would consider 
the possibility of his memory having suddenly played him false; or 
of his having had a delusive experience, in a period of time much 
less than the experience itself seemed to last: or of his having
dreamed, though the usual evidence for his being asleep was not 
present. The difference between the last tv/o possibilities might be 
merely terminological, but the first is distinct. It is not a 
concession to Malcolm to admit there might be cases where we have no 
way of choosing between a dream and a trick of memory. The above 
case is intended to demonstrate that a distinction can be drawn 
between the time in which a dream occurs, and the time which what is 
experienced therein, is experienced as taking, and furthermore, 
that the possibility of the actual and subjective durations not
no
corresponding, is not bound up with the ^tion of sleep.
we have argued that in some cases it is possible toonorrelate 
events in a dream with events in the outside world. So, it is not • 
clear that tne Cu.se,.,- of dreams differs other than in degree from that 
of private thoughts - very often we do not time our thoughts, nor 
note their contemporaneity with events in the outside world. It is 
not contingent that we are unable to time most dreams (if the majority 
of dreams were correlated with events in the real world - eg. the 
ringing of a bell influencing the content of a dream - our concept 
of a dream would be different, a kind of confused perception of the 
real world) but it is contingent that we are unable to time a particular 
dream, which is all we need to make out the case for dreaming as 
having duration.
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The two notions of duration we have ascribed to dreams are 
still rather vague. Firstly, such phrases as "how long the events 
which were dreamed would last if they occurred in waking life" and 
"the time which the events of the dream are experienced as taking" 
are not self-evidently equivalent. Consider a man who dreams he 
walks from Oxford Circus to Marble Arch, takes note of his surroundings 
on the way, and notes the times of departure and arrival. It might 
be that these would be in no way abnormal if they occurred in waking 
life. But this need not be the case. He might dream that he completes 
the journey in a very short time; or there might be a hiatus in his 
experience - one instant, he is at Bond Btreet, the next at Marble 
Arch; or his watch might register a time different from what it 
seemed. In his dream, he might greet such abnormalities with 
surprise, or take them as a matter of course. Enough has been said 
to show that there are various temporal notions concerning the content 
of the dream, which are to be contrasted with that of the duration 
of the dream in physical time. What is this latter notion? Developing 
the suggestion of Pears, we might wish to define it as the time 
between the last point at which no memory of the dream could be 
elicited, and the first point at which a full acount could be elicited. 
But, it will be said, one could have no evidence for the relevant 
subjunctive hypotheticals - one cannot work on the same dream twice 
and see what would happen if (contrary to the last time) one did 
or did not awaken someone at a particular time. Now the possibility 
of correlating the contents of a dream with external events and the 
sleeper's bodiljf movements (including talking in sleep) allows us 
in certain cases to estimate the time at which portions of a dream
53.
are dreamed; this gives us a notion of the beginning and end of a 
dream. Secondly, the phenomenon of HEM (Incidence of dream-recall 
high or low after REM or non-REM awakenings) is evidence that there 
are beginnings and ends of dreams in the sense of the definition 
based on Pears' suggestions. Our assumptions about memory and the 
relation of inner mental life suggest that these two notions of 
duration should correspond. I do not think we can go beyond this 
at present. Malcolm is right to suggest that the assignment of 
definite durations to dreams plays little part in our ordinary
dealings with drei-ms, which is not to say our concept is not of
something with duration, still less that it leaves no room for the 
idea of the duration of a dream. Scientific evidence will be needed 
to give further content to the concept of the duration of a dream.
The definition implied by Pears seems to demand some way of bringing 
about the recurrence of a dream, or of predetermining the content 
of a dream. Possibly, hypnosis will furnish a method.
The ways in which we have tried to characterize the notion 
of the duration of a dream lead naturally to a question about the 
ordering of events in a dream: given that we can speak of the time
at which one dreams a certain part of the dream, is the order in
which v/e dream the events of a dream in physical time the same as 
the order in the dream-narrative? Or would it be possible for someone 
to dregm he got out of bed, got dressed, went out and caught a bus, 
and yet it be discovered that he dreamed he caught a bus, before 
he went out etc. If we took as our evidence for the order in physical 
time, his talking in his sleep, it is possible he could utter, "Oh,
Footnotes
1. This might mean either bringing it about that someone has a 
dream at a certain time by some previous operation, or being 
abPe to predict from his state a certain time that he will later 
have a dream with a certain content.
54.
there's the bus", "I must be off", "Where's my tie?", and “The alarm 
clock's too loud", in that order. Unless we were able to produce an 
account of the dream which somehow reconciled the tv/o orders (say 
by eliciting further recollections of the dream),then if we adhered 
to the view that he had experiences corresponding to his utterances 
and contemporaneous with them, we would be presented with a case where 
the experience differed from what was remembered in respect of the 
order of the constituent events. There would be various possible 
reactions to this - abandoning the view that that dream was datable 
in the way v/e thought, abandoning the evidence of talking in one's 
sleep or assuming his memory played him false. The first tv/o 
decisions seem gratuitously severe - unless the phenomenon became 
common - for many other question besides the ordering of events in 
a dream would be affected by their adoption. Ï think v/e would aay 
that he had simply misremembered his dream (perhaps he was unconsciously 
rationalising a confused series of events into a coherent story), Or 
possibly, that there had been more to the dream than he remembers, 
such as his thinking over the events in a different order afterwards.
This puzzle case is important as it strikingly reveals that the notion 
of dreams as datable has content; in conjunction with our ordinary 
reliance upon memory the notion leads us to expect certain phenomena, 
such as this puzzle-case not to occur.
The above discussion has pointed up some of the other requirements 
our analysis of dreaming must meet. We have used the notions of 
misremembering a dream. This leads us to the ideas of totally forgetting 
a dream, and of revising one's account of a dream. If we assume 
dreams take a finite time, the possibility of our having an infinite 
number of dreams which we never remember is ruled out. Moreover, one’s
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memories of dreams must, in geneeal, be correct; otherwise it would 
be problematic whether we should speak of memory here. Malcolm 
would say that one can have no evidence for thecontent of a dream, 
other than the waking recollection. (If people’s reports of their 
dreams on a given night usually agreed with those of others, we might 
be inclined to say that those who gave a different report had 
inaccurately remembered their dreams. This is not so, and our concept 
of dreaming would be different if it was.) However, we use "talking 
in one's slepp" as evidence for the content of a dream, and htnce 
there is a possibility of the two types of evidence conflicting. The 
above puzzle-case shows that we would not automatically legislate 
in favour of the waking report. It would be of prime importance tk 
a pgchoanalyst if a sleeper were heard to talk in his sleep, uttering 
words of an erotic nature, but all references to them being surpressed
no
in the waking report. I know of^such ^ case in psychoanalytic 
literature, but this is probably because psychoanalysts are not in 
the habit of observing their patients sleeping, not because it would 
find no interpretation in psychoanalytic theory. (Wittgenstein 
seems to overlook this possibility - "Investigations" p222)
Pears makes the point that we are not always immediately 
able to produce a dreara-report which seems right, the uncertainty 
not being due to our being unable to find the right words to describe 
a fully-fledged meraory-impression. Malcolm might say that, onee one 
has arrived at a final account, there is no sense in saying that it 
may still be wrong. But how is one to identify the final accounts If 
by "final" we mean temporally the last it seems contingent what is 
the final account (perhaps the person does after making it). If by
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"final" we mean "definitive", what way can Malcolm offer, of 
identifying such an account? Malcolm’s assertion that if the dreamer 
altered his account too often, he would not be telling a dream, is 
unsupported by any evidence or argument. Possibly, it is a confusion 
with the plausible thesis that if the dreamer altered his account 
too often we should cease to place any reliance on his account of thdt 
dream. On Malcolm’s account, if v/e prefer the later version to the 
former, this can be no more than a stipulation. It seems to me that 
Malcolm ought, in consistancy, to say that if someone slightly alters 
his account of a dream, he is really telling two separate dreams rather 
than making successive attempts to recount the same dream. But if 
the person is trying to remember something he experienced, we can 
say; when he gives his second account he has the benefit of knowing 
his earlier account and correcting it in the light of further 
recollections.
I shall have more to say on the idea of "forgetting" as applied 
to dreams later. The requirements that we must allow the sleeper's 
bodily movements to afford eviddnce that he is dreaming, and that 
external stimuli can modify the content of a dream have already been 
discussed, and have played a basic role in our analysis. We raised 
the question: what is the relation between something that modified 
the content of a dream and what one dreams? If a bell rings when 
one is asleep, and because of this one dreams of a bell ringing, can 
one say one has heard the bell? There are difficulties:- (a) the bell 
is not "heard" against a background of veridical sense-experiênces.
Footnotes
1. For^malcolm’s own account, there is nothing to which the two
recollections correspond or fail to correspond, and have nothing 
which we can regard as the same dream in each case.
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(b) it need not be "heatd" as it really sounds (an alarm-clock 
might be heard as church-bells) or perhaps not even as ringing.
(c) one cannot rationally resolve to "hear" the bell, and listen 
more intently next time one dreams. (d) There seems to be a certain 
arbitrariness as to whether one "hears" the bell in a certain case - 
one does not seem able to specify conditions about normal observers, 
"hearing" the bell when dreaming if suitably placed. (e) the ringing 
of the bell causes one to dream of a bell. Even if it is of the
bell in one's room that one dreams, con one set yp criteria of identity 
from the real world to dreams to the extent of saying one "heard"the 
bell. I do not know whether such considerations are sufficient to 
make the/use^of "hear" inappropriate, but it certainly seems safer 
to rest content with a purely causal idiom.
Finally there is the question of what kind of memory-irapressions 
are relevant in speaking of dreams. We have assumed, and Malcolm 
seems to assume (p$5, p5&) that memories of dreams are memory- 
irapressions of events in which the dreamer participated or which 
he witnessed. Can we rule out the possibility of someone dreaming 
p, where p involves no reference to the person who dreamed, say that 
the Battle of Hastings was fought in 1067 simpliciter? If someone 
awoke with the conviction that the Battle of Hastings was fought in 
1067, and this were taken as evidence that he dreamed it, we might 
seek a justification of the word "awoke". It could be the case that 
he was known not to have believed this before going to bed, his sleep 
seeming to coincide with the genesis of his new belief. To what 
extent words v/e associate this new belief with his sleeping - we 
might conceivably postulate a causal connection, but would we say 
he dreamed? For it is not clear we ought to speak of memory here;
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the person believes the Battle was fought in 106?, but there may be 
nothing he seems to remember as a foundation for his belief. If we 
say simply that he is attempting to remember a fact, and getting it 
wrong, this takes it out of the category of dreams. Now dreams are 
not normally marked by a persisting belief in the contents of the 
dream after one has awoken. If the personn simply claims tohave 
dreamed the Battle was fought in 106?, we would press for a justification 
of the word "dream" as against "believed during the night". If 
there were no experience which he seemed to remember such as being 
present at the Battle or being told it was fought in 1067, the use 
of the word "dream" would seem to hang in the air. As v/e have seen, 
Malcolm assumes this, but it is not clear that he is being consistent.
On his analysis it is obscure why v/e should draw a distinction here: 
it seems a brute fadt that only meniory-impressions of experiences 
are eligible to be dream-meraories. But if we claim that to remember 
a dream is to remember an experience, the impression of arbitrariness 
is absent.
Our analysis of dreaming seems consonant with our ordinary 
assumptions about the phenomenon, assumptions having substantive 
content, but unlikely to be refuted on a further scientific advance.
It is worth noting that our earlier analysis avoids Malcolm's 
private-language arguments (p54). We have nowhere implied that one
O w r\
learns the concept of dreaming from one's^case. Our account of how 
one learns the concept of dreaming would involve teaching by others 
just as Malcolm's does. This idea of a child waking and seeming to 
remember events that never happened would play a crucial role, but 
we would alsoattach importance to the part played by bodily movements
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(including talking in sleep); there would be a concept of teaching 
the child how to apply the present tense "is dreaming" to another 
person. Our analysis then takes the form of an enquiry what dreaming 
must be like, if such phenomena can each constitute evidence of its 
occurrence. There is a somewhat Kantian flavour to this procedure, 
though the analogy should not be pressed too far as Kant enquires 
what experience in general must be like if it is to be intelligible, 
whereas we are asking what a particular phenomenon is like if it 
can be given a unitary analysis in terms of the disjoint types of 
evidence for its occurrence. The concept, on our analysis, has 
some degrees of vulnerability to further experience; this is quite 
foreign to a truly Kantian argument.
Our claim that we use "talking in sleep" as evidence that a 
person is dreaming at the time is important; and, at the risk of some 
repetition, it would be well to get its nature clear in order to 
forestall another Malcolraian objection to our thesis. We have said 
that it is a contingent fact that there is some (but not a complete) 
correlation between talking in sleep, and the later reporting of a 
dream. As we do not regard our inference that someone is dreaming 
because he is talking in his sleep as shaken if he awakes with no 
dream to tell, the connection between talking in sleep and dreaming 
must be more than merely emprical. It cannottherefore be objected 
that to use talking in sleep as evidence for dreaming, we need to 
establish that the sleeper means what he says. We do not need to 
establish anything further; the inference from a person's talking in
'I
his sleep to his dreaming is immediate . Similarly, to use a person's 
Footnotes
1. For this reason, I make no apology for bracketting "talking in 
sleep" with "bodily movements in sleep".
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talking in his sleep as evidence for the content of his dream, we 
need only establish that he knows the meaning of the words he uses, 
which can be done on the basis of his waking behaviour. I do not 
have to establish that a person is awake, to say that he knows the 
meaning of a word. Malcolm’s arguments that one cannot mean anything 
in sleep, becomes relevant later when we discuss whether a person can 
make judgements in sleep, but I would oppose to this, the same argument 
as to the claim that one cannot make a judgement in sleep; that it 
collapses into a stipulation as a non-avowed judgement cannot be used 
criterially to establish that someone is awaKe.
what we have done so far may be described as extracting the
necessary features of dreaming without which it would not be what
it is. It is not within our scope to investigate the many purely
empirical features of dreaming falling within the province of the
empirical psychologist. But there are certain borderline topics
hinted at b;^ our reservations about the application of the criterion/
symptom distinction, where it is not clear just what is a conceptual
truth and what is not. On occasion we have been obliged to say that
whereas some dreams might be x, it is a conceptual truth that not all
dreams are x. The use of bodily movements in. sleep as evidence for
dreaming gives a sense to the idea of someone having a dreamuwhich
he never subsequently remembers. But# obviously, if "dream" were
never subsequently remembered, the concepts of "drecjning" would be
quite different. There ar further questions like this, where it is
uncertain at what point to leave the matter to the empirical
ia
psychologist. My justification for dealing with them, firstly.
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completeness, and secondly that a discussion of some of these topics 
is a necessary preliminary to a discussion of dreaming as a basis 
for philosophical scepticism. The treatment of dream-scepticism itself 
needs no aopology, as, besides its intrinsic interest, it was 
historically the source of the philosophers* concern with dreaming. 
Furthermore, it is claimed by Malcolm that the received view of
dreaming furnishes no defence against dream-scepticism, whereas his
analysis does.
The questions I shall discuss are of the form, "might a dream
be X?" or "might y count as a dream?".
(a) Must there always be an unveridical element in dreams? Given 
that someone dreamed he had a certain experience, must it 
always be true of the experience, under some description, 
that he did not have it? Might someone asleep at the wheel,
dream he is driving along a motorway, when he is doing just
that?
(b) If dreams arë characterized by their unveridicality, can 
this be expressed adequately in terms of their failure to
cohere with waking life? And if this is so, might it be
possible for them to cohere to each other? And could this 
force us to recognize a dream-world with as much claim to . v..r 
reality as our waking life?
(c) Is it possible that dreams could constitute an avenue of 
knowledge, say, precognitive knowledge, distinct from 
ordinary sense-perception? To what extent would such a 
possibility be in conflict with the claim that dreams are 
characterized by their unveridicality.
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(d) Must dreams always be dream-like or surrealistic, as
O.L. Austin seems to think (Sense and Sensibilia p133), or 
might a dream follow on from the events of the previous day, 
without failing to cohere with them, and without any 
qualitative difference from waking life?
(e) How brief and alternated can a dream be? Could someone 
dream he struck a match, simpliciter?
The above questions are loosely formulated, and it will be 
our task to clarify them further. Turning to question (a), we are 
faced with the problem; if we assert that someone dreamed that p, 
and yet p was the case, in order to justify using the word "dream" we 
must somehow disconnect his experience of p from the state of affairs 
expressed by "p". If it is assented that someone actually saü 
Westminster Abbey on fire, it cannot then be added that the experience 
was a dream - any such addition would be a correction of his earlier 
statement. In this sense, dreams must necessarily be unveridical, 
though they might "cohere" with waking experience. Malcolm uses 
the example of some one dreaming that he witnesses the burning of 
Westminster Abbey, and v/aking to learn that the Abbey had been burnt 
down in the night. But in Malcolm’s example (p68) the dreamer is 
miles away from the event, and could not possibly have witnessed 
it. Surely, it might be said, what one can dream at/Sime and place, 
one could dream at another. Could one dream that Westminster Abbey 
was on fire, when on the spot and in a position to observe it, and 
it actually be on fire at the time? A possible reply is that one could 
be "on the spot", but not "in a position to observe it" - one would 
have to be asleep. This would leave us with a residue of unveridicality,
63.
for an experience to be called a dream, one needs reason to believe 
that it was of something that did not occur, or that could not have 
been witnessed by the person using his ordinary sensory faculties.
It must always be possible to drive a wedge between the experience 
and the event. There is still a difficulty which may be brought out 
as follows; we do not close our ears when we are asleep. It is not 
inconceivable that someone would sleep with his eyes open? If so, then 
it might be possible for someone to be asleep with his eyes open 
and dream that Westminster Abbey was burning down, and do this while 
Westminster Abbey actually was burning down, and while he was so 
placed that, had he been awake, he would have witnessed it. This 
possibility seems required by our theory, yet it is not clear what 
evidence could count for its being the case in a particular instance. 
Now, of course, to recognize that someone is asleep with his eyes 
open, we would need reason to think that he is not conscious of the 
outside world, in particular, that he is not seeing the outside world. 
(There would be no difficulty in the sase of a blind man). But his 
later apparent memory of seeing the fire would tell heavily against 
this. To insist that he dreamed it, we would need very strong evidence 
that he could not see the fire - and, so far as I can see, such 
evidence would have to be of an empirical, causal nature. There could 
be empirical evidence that someone in a certain bodily state cannot 
see, even if his eyes are open (our knowledge of blindness shows this 
is so) which we would not allow to be overthrown by one apparent 
counter-example.
The above discussion provides the material for answering (c).
For an experience to be called a dream, there must be reason to think
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that the experience was of something that could not have been 
witnessed by the person with his ordinary sensory faculties. It is 
conceivable that someone could have dreams the content of which had 
an uncanny correspondence with events in the real world, which he could 
not possibly have witnessed. It seems possible that this could 
happen so frequently that he should come to rely on them as giving 
information. The important points of our analysis are, firstly, that 
in order to establish the experience as a dream, it must be shown th4 
he could not have had the experience by the normal deliverances of 
the senses, and secondly, that it is by means of the sensory 
equipment of human beings that one could check the "veracity" of 
the dream. The residue of unveridicality would reside in the new 
avenue of knowledge being only contingently established as such. The 
dreamer would not be thought of as having had an experience which 
was/corrieîated with them.
Question (b) suggests another way in which dreams might come 
to be seen as in some way veridical. We have distinguished a "real" 
element in a dream, namely that the dreamer has a datable experience 
in sleep and also an "unreal" element, in that the experience is 
not of the real world. V/e might refer to these as claims about the 
reality of the dream and the dream-world respectively. The possibility 
we are about to consider is that of ascribing a different ontological 
status to the content of the dream. There are primitive tribes who 
accord vS reality to dreams in a way quite foreign to WesternCulture.
A man is held responsible for what he dreams he does, and is rewarded 
and punished, insofar as he makes the content of his dreams public. 
Possibly, this is just to attach a greater significance to the dream 
than does the ordinary Western man, a procedure which finds an echo
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in the practice of psychoanalysts, iossibly the question of the 
reality of the dream-world is a question of the importance attached 
to it. Yet a case can be developed in which the question of the 
reality of the dream-world has mox^ substantive content, although 
in a v;ay involving, in a crucial sense, the notion of importance. 
Quinton does so in "Philosophy" (I962) pl4l et.seq. to which the 
reader is referred.
The case Quinton describes seems to establish his point 
adequately and I shall not reproduce it. A way of describing the 
state of affairs hé envisages, which he does not consider but which 
has some intuitive appeal to describe the lakeside world as a 
dream, from the point of view of our world, and our world as a dream, 
from the point of view of the lakeside world. The ontological status 
of one would be determined by the ontological statue we ascribe to 
the other. This would still accommodate Quinton's point that the 
seriousness of the consequences of ones actions and so on, determines 
the reality which we accord to the experiences. For events in the 
lakeside world would have consequences for later experience in that 
world, but very much less important consequences for the other.
It was impossible to eliminate connections between the two worlds, 
for it was found that falling asleep in one world resulted in one's 
awakening in the other. But there would be a whole range of events 
in one world which would not have serious consequences in the other. 
The point of usigg the mode of expression suggested above would be 
to retain the notion of a dream as unveridical, in a sense weakened 
to that of being irrelevant (ord&ost so) to states of affairs in 
the world we favour with the term "real". It would be a decision to
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adopt a terminology minimising the difference between the new type 
of dreaming and the one with which we are acquainted.
Quinton's fantasy presupposes a considerable measure of coherence 
in the dream of the lakeside. There is no trace of any dream-like 
or surrealistic quality, (and part of the claim that dreams do not 
usually cohere with waking life, is that they are often quite 
unlike waking experience). Anyone who felt this to be a necessary 
feature of dreams would reject the possibility as a conceivable 
account of a dream (lean see no grounds for rejecting this possibility 
in itself). However such a view would be unjustified. We recognize 
the possibility of the content of a dream constituting a coherent 
story such as might occur in waking life. People report such things. 
It is quite conceivable that an account of something which did not 
occur, or could not have been witnessed by the narrator should be 
empirically possible. If dreams were to become generally more akin 
to experiences in waking life, our allocation of memories to the 
category of memories of dreams might be less automatic, and what 
Malcolm calls the inferential nature of our judgements that we have 
dreams more explicit (though, in most cases, there would still be 
the lack of continuity between dreaming and waking in bed). But 
we would never attempt to rebut someone's claim that he dreamed 
by pointing out that the events he claimed to have dreamed were 
too much like events that might actually occur. This seems to answer 
question (d) above; if a dream can be, as regards its contents, akin 
to waking life, there seems no reason why it should not be a natural 
equal to the events of the previous day. For example, on Sunday night
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someone might dream of the events of a typical Monday morning, such 
as might follow the Sunday night in question. Only on waking, 
does he discover he has been dreaming, and that Monday still lies 
ahead. Although this possibility is not expressed in terras of 
Malcolm’s analysis, it is a graphic illustration of one of his 
arguments against the coherence principle a.j an answer to dream- 
scepticism. (Here one would be having a dream which does cohere 
with one's previous life; there is also the possibility of having 
a dream in which one thinks the events of the dream cohere with one's 
past - though they do not).
Turning nov/ to question (e) we see that Malcolm's analysis 
provides an unequivocal answer. There are, on his view, no limits 
to the brevity of "p" in "he dreamed that p" provided "p" describes 
some kind of experience. We have seen that Malcolm takes the conditions 
for a complete description of a dream as somewhat similar to those 
for a grammatical English sentence. I have argued that part of what 
we mean by calling dreaming an experience is that to the statement 
that someone dreamed he struck a match, it is pertinent to press 
the question as to what the match was like, and even if no answer is 
forthcoming to assume that it must have had some attributes in the 
dream. For if one allows that someone might remember a dream of 
striking a match, and yet claim the raatch/oî no particular shape 
of colour, one wants to ask why he describes it as a match, or 
even as a physical object. (A match belongs to the category of 
objects with shape and colour.) Unless we conceive of the teller of
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the dream trying to remember determinate properties of the objects 
in his dream, which he may or may not remember correctly,(or which 
he may or may not remember at all) then the status of those details 
he does remember is called into question. The telling of the dream 
begins to look either like an imaginative composition, or like a 
causally determined distribution to make ceritin utterances perhaps 
through the intermediary of a specious memory-impression ). If we 
are to retain the idea of telling a dream as an attempt to remember 
something, in which the constraints are normative (one is trying 
to get it right) rather than purely causal,we must circumvent the 
verificationist suspicion of the notion of the correctness of the 
dream-report. This we have already done, but consideration of 
the following problem will help straigthen our position.
How far must the description of a dream be filled out in order 
to yield a complete account of dream? With the claim that someone 
dreamed he struck a match simpliciter, one might feet that there 
must have been more to the dream than that, that incidents must have 
been forgotten or omitted. When people recount dreams they tend 
to produce longer narratives than this, or apologize for being unable 
to recall the dream in its entirety. In the latter case, are they 
motivated by the conviction that there must have been more to the 
dream, or do they dimly remember that something else happened, though 
they cannot remember what? I can see no conceptual reason to suppose 
that a complete account of a dream must have a certain minimum length.
(I am thinking now of the number of incidents, not of the circumstantial 
detail). However, the fact remains that our recollections of dreaming
Footnotes
1. Ayer makes these two points (though separately) in his article 
in the Journal of Philosophy (I96O)
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are often accompanied by the conviction that we do not remember 
the whole of the dream, and it seems necessary to make sense of 
this feeling, in some ways, problematic - how can one dimly remember 
that something else happened, though one cannot rèmember what? Such 
a feeling is nkt peculiar to one's recollections of dreams, but as 
regards waking life, the situation is different. If one cannot recall 
what one did during a certain interval, one can at least be certain 
that one did something, even if only lounge around. The publicity 
of physical time means that it is, in principle, possible to ascertain 
the whereabouts and actions of a person at a certain time. But there 
are cases where this is not our ground for our conviction thatthere 
was more than we remember - in recalling a conversation, for example.
But the recognition of this fact does not clarify the problem, it 
merely generalizes it beyond the field of dreams.
Suppose someone walces, and remembers dreaming he struck a
match, and yet feels there was more to the dream than this. Owing
to the surrealistic character of many dreams, it seems impossible
to infer further sections of the dream from what is, in fact,
remembered, for example, tncxt cae striking of the match seemed
done for a reason. Moreover, even if such arguments are valid, they
would not cover all the cases we want.to consider: someone might
simply remember dreaming he struck a match, and feel convinced there
was more to the dream, yet offer no reasons for his conviction.
A characteristic of dreams is the difficulty one often has in retaining
1
them in one’s conscious memory : psychologosts who have attempted
Footnotes
1. This is ïiAif reason why we can recognize the possibility of someone’s 
having a dream he never remembers. If he does not recall it 
upon waking, the chances that he will do so become progressively 
less with lapse of time. Thus, if we do not retract our statement 
that someone is dreaming on the basis of his talking in his sleep, 
when he wakes with no dream to tell, it becomes progressively 
less plausible to maintain that this is because we think he 
will?“tell a dream.
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to catalogue their dreams have usually found it necessary to note 
them down immediately on waking. Let us suppose that someone wakes 
and realizes that he has been dreaming. He may not attempt to recall 
the dream in its entirey. If we rejectthe view that the content 
of the dream is dependent upon whether the person who has dreamed 
attempts to recall his dream and the effort he puts into it, itseems 
reasonable to consider the following possibility: he may on waking
feel he could give a complete account of the dream, but later he 
may not feel it possible. The later conviction that there was more 
to the dream than he can remember, would then be based on the conviction 
that, had he tried earlier, he could have given a fuller account. 
Furthermore, people who seem to remember there was something else 
very often eventually recall what that something was ie. the 
experience of seeming to remember there was something else need not 
be a mere experience. I am not saying that the conviction that there 
was more to the dream than one can remember is based on a conviction 
that one will eventually remember what, but that the fact that one 
does often remember what, gives point to the conviction that there 
was something more. It will be seen that these considerations, in 
a similar way, weaken the verificationist suspicion of the claim 
that the match in one’s dream must have had some colour though one 
cannot remember what. I have spoken of the conviction that there 
was more to the dream than one can remember; if this can be thought 
of as a memory that there was more to the dream than one remembers 
(that is, as the limiting case, of a series of memories progressively 
diminishing in detail) then our reliance upon it can be justified, 
morë briefly. For it seems a conceptual truth, that we treat memories
Footnotes
1. People might differ in their ability to retain the memory of 
their dreams. We might easily introduce the idea of someone 
who, in this respect, "were a man with a quite specially bad 
memory". ("Investigations" pl84)
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of our own mental processes as correct, given no evidence to 
the contrary, for if we did not, the concept of an objective past 
would be inapplicable to a past mental process not given behavioural 
expression at the time. (This is not to say that we regard memories 
of our own mental processes as incorrigible;. However, I am not 
certain that the assimilation of the conviction to memory is valid.
We are ready now to turn to a discussion of dreaming as a basis
for philosophical scepticism. Let us begin by considering Malcolm’s
views on the subject. He begins (p1l4) by quoting Justin - "There
are recognized ways of distinguishing between dreaming and waking.
(How otherwise should we know how %o use and contrast the words?)"
Austin, says Malcolm, maintains this not because he can produce these
ways, but because he assumes he can know he is awake, and must have
some way of doing it. Malcolm claims that we know how to use the
words, "I am awake", but not the words "I am dreaming". However, as it
e
is sometimes correct to say "I am awakyf", we are led to believe that 
there must be a way of telling one is awake. But it is not the case 
that, realizing it would be absurd to declare oneself asleep, one 
can conclude one knows one is awake, having conclusive evidence that 
one is awake. For nothing counts for the truth of "I am not awakè", 
and hence for "I am awake". Malcolm admits that one might have 
a test that one is fully awake. But this just means "fully alert".
He also admits that there is a use for expressions like "Am I dreaming?" 
which is “to express surprise at some appearance, and perhaps to 
question whether things are as they seem." But this should not lead 
us to ignore the senselessness of "How can I tell whether I am awake?"
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For there are ways of telling one is having an hallucination, but 
no ways of telling that one is awalce. It is not Malcolm's intention 
to provide an argument by which someone can prove to himself that 
he is awake (see his disclaimer in response to Warnock on p1l8). 
"There are not two things for me to decide between, one that I am 
awake, the other that I am not awake. There is nothing to decide, 
no choice to make, nothing to find out." For since the fact that 
one is awake is contingent them, if one could know it, it would have 
to be by observation, and then sense would have to be allowed to 
speaking of knowing one is asleep by observation. The temptation 
to say that one can know by observation that one is awake comes, 
according to Malcolm, from the fact that sometimes I can rightly 
apply the word "awake" to my state,But though one can apply it 
correctly, one could not apply it incorrectly. This is not noting, 
distinguishing or picking out a state. When one says, "I am awake" 
one is showing someone is awake. "I am not awake" might do just as 
well.
Malcolm's thesis is that if someone says "I am not awake" 
it is not that he is making a statement that is automatically false, 
but that he is failing to make a significant statement. The facts 
that one can parse the expression "I am not awake", and that it can 
occur in a subordinate clause (eg. "He thinks I am not awake") are, 
for him, insufficient to give to the expression on its own, unless 
it is regarded as other than the logical contrary of "I am awake"
He would, no doubt, concur in the view that "I am awake" is what 
Wittgenstein would call a grammatical remark. Malcolm's reason for
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adopting thé view that “I am not awake” cannot be given a sense as 
the logical contrary of ”I am awake", rather than the view that "I am 
awake” expresses a proposition which is automatically false seems 
to be that we could never give a sense to the notion of someone 
correctly applying the expression to himself. Anything that would 
tendto show that the man was conscious of what he said would 
tend to show he was awake. One could never teach the use of the 
expression, nor establish that it was being correctly used. This 
argument cannot be refuted by saying that many sentences are not 
taught, the essence of language being that many statements one 
has never heard before can be made and understood. For Malcolm would 
retort that such sentences could be taught, whereas this cannot.
There is a difficulty, however, in Malcolm’s assumption that 
for an expression to be seen to be used correctly it must be seen 
to be used truly. He rejects the possibility that someone might 
reveal his understanding of the expression "I am not awaks” by 
exhibiting the knowledge that it is false each time it is uttered.
It seems that for an expression to be seen to be used correctly, 
it need not be used in the presence of the puuauive ioiou xo expresses, 
vmalcolm presumably realises that for an expression to be used 
correctly it need not be used in the presence of the putative fact 
it expresses). Malcolm needs some independent reason for refusing 
to assign a truth-value to "I am not awake”, but I cannot find that 
he gives one. So far, we have followed Malcolm in his assumption 
that ”I am not awake” cannot be used to make a true statement, and 
argued that it does not follow that it cannot have a truth-value 
and cannot be used to make a statement, but this assumption can be
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challenged.
According to Malcolm one cannot make a judgement when asleep, 
and therefore the sentence "I am not awake” cannot be used to make 
a true judgement. But we have seen reason to reject the view that 
one cannot malce a judgement when asleep. We have argued that to dream 
one makes a judgement is to make a judgement in sleep. At a certain 
time it might be true to say that at an earlier time someone dreamed 
that he made the judgement that p. If there were no reason to suppose 
that the person was asleep at the time, we should not be inclined 
to use the locution ”He dreamed that he judged that p”. Gan we say 
that the difference between the locutions ”Iie judged that p” and 
"He dreamed that he judged that p”is that we use the former of someone 
who was awake at the time, and the latter of someone who was asleep?
It is not a counter-example to this thesis that we might say that 
someone dreamed that he judged that p, on the basis of his memory
of judging that p being a part of a clear example of a memory of a
dream. For to accept this inference, one would have to accept that 
he was asleep at the time of dreaming the judgement. I suggest that 
there are no grounds for opposing the assimilation of dreaming one 
judges to judging in the way suggested . (I am speaking of conceptual 
grounds; future empirical discoveries might lead us to believe, say 
that the physiological bases of the two are entirely different) If 
it is possible that one might make a judgement while asleep, there 
seems no grounds for ruling out such judgements as "I am asleep",
"I am not awake”, or "I am dreaming”. Someone might say that as soon
as one realises one has been dreaming, one has awoken so that it can
Footnotes
1. In the case of achievement-words eg. "He dreamed he solved a 
problem” , the assimilation seems to fail. But if we interpret 
this statement as "He dreamed he thought he solved a problem”, 
even this can be accommodated. It is because "He solved a problem” 
depends for its truth on more thah the person’s state of mind 
that the interpretation is needed.
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never be true to say "I am dreaming", but as one might still be 
unconscious of the ou side world, this would seem to be counter­
intuitive. If we recognise that "I am asleep" and "I am dreaming" 
have sense, then the possibility of being in doubt whether one is 
awake cannot be ruled out. Hor «ran the possibility that one might 
have a way of knowing that one is awake.
Traditionally, philosophers have felt that this need was answered 
by the coherence principle. What is this principle? On p 107,
Malcolm interprets Leibniz and Russell as follows; "It would appear 
to be implied that a person can find out whether he is dreaming or 
awake by noting the nature of the connections of his present 
'perceptions', 'objects of sense' with other past and present ones, 
although Russell would agree with Leibniz that the conclusion could 
have probability only and not absolute certainty... it is by taking 
note of the connection of 'the phenomena' that one can tell whether 
one is awake or dreaming". To this Malcolm presents the objection: 
"Making use of the principle consists in noting whether certain 
'phenomena' presented to one are connected in the right ways with 
other phenomena, past, present or future, "but" it is possible that 
a person should dream that the right connections hold, dream that 
he connects his present perceptions with the whole course of his life." 
This arguement, Malcolm admits, allows some of the assumptions he 
is concerned to attack. He, therefore, proceeds to criticize the 
coherence theorists from an angle more in keeping with his own views.
If "I am dreaming" would express a judgement it would imply the 
judgement "I am asleep", and, if the latter is absurd, as Malcolm 
claims, so is the former. Consequently, he writes, the question
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"How can I tell whether I am awake or dreaming?" turns out to be 
without sense, since it implies that it is possible to judge that one 
is dreaming. Furthermore, the question seems to presuppose that one 
might be able to tell that one dreaming - which is doubly nonsensical, 
in that it implies that one could make a nonsensical judgement while 
asleep. Thus, "the coherence principle ahs a sensible application 
to the question "Was I dreaming?", but none at all to the question 
"Am I dreaming?". We have seen reason to reject this latter argument, 
as it is to the former that we must turn.
If we look at Malcolm's first argument, we see that it may be 
generalised as follows; Let x be some characteristic of experiences, 
which it is claimed marks them as waking experiences. Then if 
we suppose it possible to tell we are awgke by noting the presence of 
X, we will be met by the rejoinder, "Perhaps you are only dreaming that 
X is present". This criticism suggests a further question; is it 
possible that we are only dreaming that x characterizes waking experiences. 
If X is merely a contingent accompaniment of waking experience then 
this is possible. And if we regard the presence of x as part of 
the analysis of being awalce, it seems possible that someone should 
have a dream in which he subscribes to an incorrect analysis of what 
it is to be awake (after all, in waking life he would subscribe to 
an incorrect analysis of waking). The question "Might I only be 
dreaming that I have a correct analysis of being awake?" seems strange, 
but part of this oddity comes from a confusion with the absurd question, 
"Might I only be dreaming that I know what being awake is?" But it is 
clear that to know the meaning of the word in not necessarily to be 
able to give a correct analysis, of it.
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• Nevertheless, even when the distinct on is made, the question 
"High I only be dreaming I have a correct analysis of being awake?" 
is puzzling. VJe seem completely at the mercy of the concept "dream".
We are assumed to have a pre-analytic understanding of what it is to 
dream, and this understanding raises a question which suggests that 
any attempt to analyse the concept of being awake, and hence of 
sleeping, and dreaming is doomed to uncertainty. If we were to allow 
this kind bf argument, it would tell against Malcolm's defence against 
scepticism, as surely as against those of others. Doubtless, Malcolm 
is right to attempt analyses of dreaming, waking and sleeping, and then 
proceed to consider the status of such questions as "Might I now 
be dreaming that..." But the grounds for this are far from clear. 
Someone might interject as Malcolm begins (or we begin) an analysis, 
"You know what dreaming is. Consider then the possibility that you 
are merely dreaming you are achieving an analysis". Malcolm could 
hardly reply that it is part of his prephilosophical grasp of the word 
"dream", that he knows it is senseless to suppose he might now be 
dreaming, as this is one of the most controversial features of his
'I
analysis • The way out of this impasse seems to be this (and it 
seems available j:o Malcolm as much as to anyone else) : whereas I
have a pre-analytic understanding of the word "dream", this does 
not show that I understand any grammatically respectable sentence 
in which the word "dream" occurs. If someone suggests that I might 
only be dreaming that I have achieved a correct analysis of "sleep", 
"wakefulness" or "dreaming", perhaps I can plead that 1 do not 
understand this supposition. And, indeed, |t is far from pellucid.
It is obviously intended to imply that one's analysis is suspect p» 
hence the phrase "only dreaming". But then, it is not clear that the 
Footnotes
1. There may be a sense in which the supposition that I might now 
be dreaming is senseless, in that it is rarely entertained as a 
serious possibility. I shall have more to say of this later.
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supposition differs, in any v;ay important for our purposes, from 
the suggestion, "Perhaps you are mistaken that you have achieved , or 
are working towards a correct analysis of these concepts." I may 
feel I can understand the supposition that I might only be dreaming 
I have achieved a correct analysis of these concepts, on the basis 
of my being able to understand the supposition that someone else 
might dream he has achieved such an analysis and that he might be 
wrong. But if l do feel this, then what is in question is une uruun 
uf ray analysis, rather than my own state of consciousness. And faced 
with this, I can only look again at my analysis.
Let us now return to the question, whether, if there are features 
typical of dreaming or waking, this affords a defence against 
scepticism. One might attempt to rébut the Malcolmian argument 
in this way: perhaps I might be dreaming that x is present, but, all 
the same, that I seem to observe x is evidence that I am awake.
But it would be objected: what assumes us that the apparent presence
ofi X is evidence for being awake. It cannot be a contingent matter, 
unless we can identify undisputed cases of one’s being awake, by 
some means other than the presence of x. So it must be some kind 
of conceptual truth. We seem to have what we need in the following 
proposition:ifit is analytically true that x entails p, then an 
apparent case of x is, at least, evidence for p. Applied to the 
coherence principle, this gives: if it seems to someone that he connects
the present perceptions "with the whole course of his life" then he 
has prima facie evidenee that he is awake. The substitution of 
"apparent coherence" answers Malcolm’s objection, as we are not now
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aiming at certainty, but at probability. It was insufficient 
of Leibniz and Russell simply to say that the principle can have 
probability only, as this does not make clear on what the probability 
is based. It is on based on two conceptual truths, the one we have 
just quoted, and that the majority of dreams fail to cohere with 
waking life. We already have considerations to support this latter 
assertion. If an experience cohereddwith previous experience, it 
might still be a dream, but if it cohered also with all later 
experience, only causal considerations could lead us to regard it.as 
a dream - and this would require the acceptance of undisputed cases 
of waking experience. And if one suspects one is hating experiences 
which do not cohere with one's past, though they seem to, one can 
only look again at one's present experience. It might be suggested 
that the use of the coherence principle is regret-t^. If it is 
allowed that if I am dreaming that my present experiences cohere with 
the rest of my life, then they seem to cohere with the rest of my 
life, cannot one say: per&aps I only dream thatthey seem to cohere?
And if we counter by saying that they must seem to seem to cohere, 
the argument can be repeated ad infinitum. But what could "They seem 
to seem to cohere" mean here other than "They seem to cohere"? The 
regress is only apparent.
We have assumed that it is always a logical possibility that 
I might later come to regard my present experience as a dream ( a simple 
proof of which is that I can always imagine what it would be liké 
to waice up in the next few minutes). The principle of coherence
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is intended to provide some certainty that I am not now dreaming.
Now, one might raise the question as ÿo why I do not, in ordinary
life, take seriously the possibility that I might be dreaming.
It is worth considering the reasons, good or bad which, as a matter
of fact, operate in this area (in addition to the justification which
a philosopher might think is needed), for these lead to some
important considerations about philosophical scepticism. These
reasons are essentially reasons for an attitude to dream-scepticism;
people, in ordinary life, rarely raise the question whether they
might be dreaming. Do they believe they are awake? Or does belief,
as Wittgenstein says, imply a doubt? iii.d there may be no doubt
(which is not to say that there coula not be a doubt) I raise this 
not
point^because I think that any sceptical problem can be dissolved 
simply by saying that the proposition under attack is not a belief, 
assumption or presupposition, but a manifestation of a "form of life". 
But because, if one thinks in terms of a "form of life" including 
attitudes, activities etc. (a wider group of notions than a class 
of beliefs) it can be easier to see how these attitudes and 
activities make sense, as a greater variety of things give point to 
them.
Suppose I try to tane seriously the possibility that I might 
now be dreaming. As it makes no sense to suppose that all my 
experiences might be dreams, 1 would be faced with the problem of whd: 
sort of experiences merited my suspicions. If I regard certain 
features as typical of dream-experiences, I can perhaps regard certain 
experiences as particularly dubious. Once I allow a notion of the
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degree to which an experience is suspect, I am well on the way 
to dismissing speculation as to whether I might nov/ be dreaming 
as academic, -uut if I do not do this, I am allowing no experience 
as a better candidate than any other for being a waking experience.
Tne position is reminiscent of h x the situation we encountered in 
consmdering Russell's hypothesis, that the world has been created 
five minutes ago, complete with memory-impressio^s of events before. 
Whatever other difficulties there might be here, one wants to ask: 
why five minutes and not five seconds or five hours? We have a 
schema for the construction of countless sceptical hypotheses, rather 
than a single sceptical hypothesis, ho wonder we ignore them all.
Thus, unless we allow a notion of probability into the question 
whether I might now be dreaming (which, as I have argued, leads 
to the conclusion that it is almost certain that I amnot) I am presented 
with a hypothesis I can do nothing with. It is, perhaps, this that 
underlies the plain man's disregard for sceptical questions concerning 
dreaming. One might even regard speculation as to whether one is 
awake as "senseless".
The tendency to drop the notion of probability, and so produce 
a useless hypothesis, can be illustrated further. I have mentioned 
on several occasions that dreams are often quite unlike waking experiences 
in some respect or other. They are often hazy, in black-and-white-, 
or lac ing in continuity. We often fulfil the role of a mere observer, 
think with more than ordinary irrationality, accept the most bizarre 
situations or behave in ways quite out of character. Yet Descartes
82.
and subsequent philosophers have felt justified in saying there are 
"no certain marks" distinguishing the waking life from the dreaming 
sàate. Why is this? Partly because, if in our dreams we accept 
the abnormal, or think irrationally, we may not treat these features 
qs indicative of dreams. But thereis another, more important reason: 
it is felt that these features are neither necessary nor universal. 
Now, this assertion of contingency is interesting. It might be that 
if "lack of continuity" were a universal feature of dreaming, it 
would be treated a s a defining characteristic , and someone who 
suggested that dreams might be otherwise, would be drawing attention 
to the logical possibility of a new phenomenon in a paradoxical 
way. But such a person would still be able to make out a plausible 
case for scepticism on the basis of this possible phenomenon, for he 
could ask, "How do I know that I am not now experiencing this new 
phenomenon?" (In a course of lectures on Descartes, I remember the 
lecturer say, "In order for there to be a sceptical problem about 
dreams, it is not necessary that there should actually be known to 
be such a thing as dreaming, but only that it is possible there 
should be.")
Let us take another lookat Malcolm's handling of dream- 
scepticism. It will be remembered that Malcolm relies heavily on 
what he takes to be the empirical characteristics of our concept 
of dreaming. He says, in effect, "this is what we mean by 'dream' 
and if we are using the word correctly, it makes no sense to say 
'I might be dreaming'." It might be replied, that, even if Malcolm's 
analysis of our concept of dreaming were correct, one can imagine
Footnotes
1. Though I think this unlikely.
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a phenomenon which has the characteristics attributed to it by 
Descartes, Leibniz, Moore and Russell; such a phenomenon might not 
exist, but it could, and can therefore serve as a basis for scepticism. 
Malcolm might reply as follows: nothing could show the occurrence
of such a phenomenon, for anything that would show that a person 
was having experiences, wou&d also show that he was not asleep. Even 
if Malcolm's arguments on this point were valid, it could be counted 
by dropping the reference to sleep in one's account of the supposed 
phenomenon. I can imagine coming to regard my present experiences 
as totally underidical (that I am now living in a world of fanasy) 
at some time in the future. Malcolm would surely admit that a mental 
patient who sits in a corner of the psychiatric ward, might be 
having experiences which are not of the real world. If this is so, 
then the whole sceptical problem which is normally discussed in terras 
of dreams, could be translated into a speculation in terras of insanity.
It might, perhaps, be though unfair to criticize Malcolm in 
this way. He is after all attemptin' to provide an analysis of 
dreaming, not of something else. But it is important to realise 
that even if Malcolm were right in supposing the received view of 
dreaming to be untenable, pr kind of sceptical problem originally 
broached in terms of dreaming, would still arise in a new guise.
It is possible to have hallucinations which involve the whole of 
one's phenomenal experience at a certain time, under the influence 
of drugs, in insanity and so on. Dreaming, then, raises sceptical 
problems which can be generalised and in the end make no specific 
reference to dreaming.
